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“LIBERTY REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY”: THE 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, LUCIA V. SEC, AND 
THE NEXT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 
MICHAEL A. SABINO, ESQ.* 
ABSTRACT 
 “Liberty requires accountability” is the essential precept 
which animates the Appointments Clause of Article II. This consti-
tutional safeguard assures that those who exercise the sovereign 
power of the United States remain accountable both to the Chief 
Executive who appointed them and to the People who elected that 
President. The proviso was most recently tested in Lucia v. SEC, 
and, most assuredly, shall be in controversy again. After first 
expositing the high Court’s extensive Appointments Clause juris-
prudence presaging Lucia, this Article thoroughly explores this 
newest Article II landmark, before concluding with commentary 
upon future Appointments Clause challenges expected to soon ar-
rive before the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                             
* Associate, Crowell & Moring LLP. The opinions expressed by the author 
herein are solely his own and should not be attributed to his firm or clients. The 
author dedicates this Article to his beloved spouse, Katlyn, and his children, 
William and Charlotte. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 For over eight decades now, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or “the Commission”) has been the primary 
watchdog over Wall Street.1 Since its inception in 1934,2 the SEC 
has been tasked with regulating the securities industry in its varied 
and sundry forms. The Commission’s oversight ranges broadly from 
superintending the issuance of securities,3 to policing the mar-
ketplace for securities fraud.4 We are therefore accustomed to 
witnessing the agency exert its regulatory powers over corpora-
tions, broker-dealers, and other industry participants. 
 What is rare—indeed, almost novel—is the SEC occupying 
the eye of a constitutional storm. One does not normally associate 
the Commission with a controversy implicating the precise mean-
ing of Article II of the Constitution, and its ramifications for the 
wielding of presidential authority. 
 Yet that is exactly the scenario which brought the SEC be-
fore the United States Supreme Court in Raymond J. Lucia, et al. 
v. SEC.5 In a challenge to the lawful authority of the in-house ju-
rists the Commission employs to adjudicate alleged violations of 
the federal securities laws, the very power of the Chief Executive 
to appoint, and remove, Executive Branch officials was put to 
the test.6 
 We write this Article, not merely to exposit the immediacy 
of the Court’s newest landmark decision with respect to securi-
ties law enforcement, but with even greater awareness as to how 
this decision, conceived in a securities industry dispute, holds 
grave and long-lasting ramifications for constitutional law. For 
Lucia is far more than a high Court precedent regarding the fed-
eral securities laws; it is destined to enter the pantheon of con-
stitutional landmark decisions which determine the very meaning 
of the Constitution, particularly with respect to assuring that the 
Executive Branch remains accountable to the People. Keeping 
that overriding significance in mind, we proceed to the task at hand. 
                                                                                                             
1 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 See generally id. § 77. 
4 Id. § 78j-1(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
5 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2044 (2018). 
6 Id. at 2061. 
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 To that end, this Article shall first set forth the essentials 
of the Commission’s enforcement power, and the adjudicative 
structure empowering its administrative law judges (“ALJs”). It 
is imperative that we follow by setting forth the constitutional 
landmarks that regulate the manner in which officials of this 
type attain office, so we can better comprehend the roots of the 
Article II controversy addressed by Lucia. We shall then proceed 
to a brief recapitulation of the controversy in its nascent stage 
before the federal district courts. 
 Thereafter, we shall explore how different circuit courts of 
appeals took varying approaches in the main endeavor to avoid 
the constitutional controversy. This will naturally bring us to 
the point of unavoidable conflict between two tribunals, one of them 
the birthplace of the Lucia case, which then finally percolated to 
the highest level of the American judiciary. 
 The final element of this essential prelude shall include 
notation of the government’s sharp course reversal with respect 
to defending the decision below. All that accomplished, we shall 
then embark upon a detailed examination of Lucia in all its 
noteworthy aspects. 
 To be sure, our final analysis shall not be confined to the 
ramifications Lucia holds for the SEC’s enforcement of the secu-
rities laws. It is our intention to delve deeply into the broader, 
constitutional implications of the instant case, and its more lasting 
meaning for Article II, the Executive Branch, and all adminis-
trative agencies. 
I. GAINING PERSPECTIVE: SECURITIES LAW, THE SEC, AND ITS ALJS 
 To have the fullest appreciation possible of Lucia, one must 
first understand the securities law which provides the backdrop 
for this latest pronouncement. Certainly, in Lucia, the Supreme 
Court ruled upon a constitutional challenge rooted in the Ap-
pointments Clause of Article II.7 Yet, since the office-holders 
thereby challenged were part of the imposing construct that is fed-
eral securities regulation, the appropriate point of view is taken 
from the New Deal–era laws which have assured the nation of 
open and honest capital markets since the 1930s.8 
                                                                                                             
7 See id. at 2063. 
8 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012). 
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 The edifice that is modern federal securities law is firmly 
based on two cornerstones. The first is the Securities Act of 
1933.9 The other noble cornerstone is the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.10 
 The 1934 Act established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as the paramount federal regulator of the Nation’s 
securities markets.11 The SEC is authorized by statute to commence 
administrative enforcement proceedings against those believed 
to have violated the various securities acts.12 
 Heading the agency are five Commissioners, each ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.13 Unquestionably, the five appointees that comprise the 
SEC’s ruling council are not only officers of the United States, 
but qualify as principal officers of the United States residing 
within the Executive Branch.14 
 Obviously, five mere mortals could never undertake the 
herculean task of overseeing the securities exchanges and its 
denizens without the assistance of a sizable bureaucracy. The 
Depression-era Congress wisely gave the Commission “the au-
thority to delegate, by published order or rule, any of its func-
tions” to, among others, “an administrative law judge.”15 The 
powers which may be delegated to such a jurist include, and are 
not limited to, “hearing, determining, ordering ... or otherwise 
acting” with respect to any SEC function.16 
 In-house agency adjudicators, once called “hearing exam-
iners,” were given the title “Administrative Law Judges” in 1978, 
and the number of such positions was increased.17 Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
9 Id. § 77a. Commonly referred to as “the ’33 Act,” its focus upon regulating 
the initial issuance of securities places it well outside the scope of the instant Arti-
cle, notwithstanding that enactment’s own fascinating and noteworthy aspects. 
10 Id. § 78a. The promulgation goes by more than one nom de guerre. It is 
frequently shorthanded as the “Exchange Act,” “the 1934 Act,” or, lastly, “the 
’34 Act.” Accordingly, we shall use these referents interchangeably herein.  
11 Id. § 78d(a). 
12 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1; The Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3; The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-9(b); The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(a). 
14 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
15 § 78d-1(a). 
16 Id. 
17 See Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183, 183–84 (1978). 
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controversy which this Article concerns itself with grew from 
that tiny seed. 
 Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it might be said that 
this innocuous name change helped precipitate the Appoint-
ments Clause challenge under discussion here. Forty years ago, 
the lawmakers casually observed that administrative law judges 
“hold a position with tenure very similar to that provided for 
Federal judges under the Constitution.”18 The imprecision of that 
comparison was fraught with peril and portended the constitu-
tional crisis this Article now addresses. 
 To be sure, these newly minted ALJs were not granted 
autonomy. Undoubtedly to preserve accountability to the Chief 
Executive and the People, it was declared that “the Commission 
shall retain a discretionary right to review the action of any ... 
administrative law judge.”19 
 This oversight prerogative can be initiated by the Com-
mission sua sponte “or upon petition of a party.”20 Only a single 
Commissioner need vote in favor of review in order to bring any 
ALJ action before the full body.21 
 Significantly, should the SEC decline to exercise its power 
of oversight or if review is not requested in a timely manner, then 
the action decreed by an administrative law judge “shall ... be 
deemed the action of the Commission.”22 Note well the legislative 
choice of the imperative “shall,” and not the permissive “may,” in 
this particular proviso. 
 Of course, who guards the guardians? After all, the SEC 
is an administrative body.23 Its awesome powers to regulate the 
stock markets must be kept in check, lest we descend into a to-
talitarian regime. 
 To protect against such calamities, any person aggrieved 
“by a final order of the Commission” may seek judicial review of 
                                                                                                             
18 S. REP. NO. 95-697, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 496, 497; 
see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–15 (1978) (administrative law judges 
enjoy absolute immunity from damages lawsuits because they are “functionally 
comparable” to judges). 
19 § 78d-1(b) (emphasis added). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. § 78d-1(c) (emphasis added). 
23 See id. § 78d.  
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the relevant judgment either “in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of 
business” or, alternatively, “the District of Columbia Circuit.”24 
Not only does this assure Article III oversight, thereby preserving 
accountability, and, hence, liberty, the various options for the 
situs of the reviewing court often plays a role in the evolution of 
these proceedings, including the matter now under discussion. 
 And while the appellate tribunal is empowered to affirm, 
modify or overturn “in whole or in part” any final order of the 
Commission,25 the regulators’ factual findings are conclusive, pro-
vided they are supported by substantial evidence.26 
 The essentials of this regulatory infrastructure, that being 
the Commission, its lawful delegation of authority to adminis-
trative law judges, and so forth, remained fundamentally the 
same well into the Twenty First Century.27 It took the cataclysm 
of the Great Recession to statutorily modify the SEC’s enforcement 
powers in such a way as to provoke a constitutional challenge to 
its in-house adjudicators.28 
 This enabling legislation, made law during the heat of the 
financial meltdown in the late 2000s, is correctly known by the 
turgid moniker of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act.29 Better known by the far less cumbersome 
appellation of Dodd-Frank, this is a body of remedial statutes 
epic in proportion, and physically the size of an old-fashioned 
telephone directory.30 Thankfully, the Appointments Clause issue 
extant here permits us to take a laser-like focus upon the sole 
proviso germane to the instant controversy. 
 The revamped law expanded the role of the Commission’s 
administrative law judges in the following manner. Prior to the 
new enactment, if the SEC sought a monetary penalty against a 
                                                                                                             
24 § 78y(a)(1). 
25 § 78y(a)(3). 
26 § 78y(a)(4). 
27 See generally id. § 78a. 
28 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and 
remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
29 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), reprinted in 2010 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1; see also Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
30 See generally Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), reprinted 
in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1. 
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nonregulated individual or entity, the agency was required to 
file suit in an appropriate federal district court.31 
 Dodd-Frank changed all that by giving the regulators the 
choice of bringing such an action in the district court or by com-
mencing an administrative enforcement proceeding before its in-
house adjudicators.32 To be sure, the choice of the forum to proceed 
in lies solely within the agency’s discretion.33 
 At least one appellate court declared that Dodd-Frank 
“dramatically expanded” the Commission’s power to institute 
enforcement proceedings before its own ALJs, reputedly “with a rate 
of success notably higher than it has achieved in federal district 
courts.”34 Thus, at the commencement of the second decade of 
the Twenty First Century, we find the SEC possessed a newfound 
power.35 No longer was it required to bring supposed miscreants 
before a federal trial court for adjudication; now, the Commission 
could try alleged wrongdoers before its own, in-house tribunal.36 
 To summarize, the duties and powers of the SEC’s pre-
sent-day adjudicators, particularly in light of the Dodd-Frank 
enforcement regime, predict the controversy under review here. 
By virtue of their traditional prerogatives, as enhanced by the 
Dodd-Frank reforms, ALJs now play an even more critical role 
in upholding the federal securities acts.37 
 The Commission’s in-house jurists hear cases and create 
records of those proceedings.38 These adjudicators find facts, draw 
conclusions of law, and decide the validity of charges brought by the 
SEC against private persons.39 Notwithstanding subsequent 
review by the Commission—if any—ALJs most certainly do not 
merely advise, recommend, or investigate.40 In every sense of 
                                                                                                             
31 Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015). 
32 Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), re-
printed in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
33 Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2187 (2017). 
34 Id. at 279 (citation omitted). 
35 Id. at 278. 
36 Id. at 279. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (2006). 
2019] LIBERTY REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY 181 
the phrase, the agency’s internal jurists exercise, by any yard-
stick, significant sovereign authority.41 
 This concludes our primer upon the fundamental notions 
of federal securities regulation that set the stage for Lucia. As 
indicated, many of these statutory norms have existed since the 
Securities and Exchange Commission was created via the 1934 
Act.42 Nevertheless, it was the enactment of the Dodd-Frank 
legislation, conceived in the crisis atmosphere of the Great Re-
cession, which sparked the constitutional conflagration over the 
authority of the Commission’s ALJs.43 
 Yet Lucia was a constitutional crisis, not merely a dispute 
under the laws regulating the securities markets.44 For that reason, 
it is imperative that we next turn to the fundamental principles 
of constitutional law which formed the basis for the high Court’s 
newest landmark. 
II. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE: TEXTUAL FUNDAMENTALS AND 
SUPREME COURT LANDMARKS 
 From the very inception of the Republic, one of the para-
mount motivations of the Founders was a justifiable concern for 
power concentrated in the hands of the one or the few, and worse 
yet, such authority lacking accountability to the political will of 
the citizenry.45 It was this “fear that prompted the Framers to 
build checks and balances into our constitutional structure.”46 
 Specifically, to preserve our ordered system of liberty from 
the excesses of executive power, the Framers acted upon a fun-
damental and inarguable precept. “Liberty requires accountabil-
ity.”47 In recognition of that basic truth, the Framers incorporated 
several “accountability checkpoints” into the Constitution,48 
each one securing separation of powers and checks and balances. 
                                                                                                             
41 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
42 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012). 
43 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126–27; Tilton, 824 F.3d at 276, 279–80. 
44 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018). 
45 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1244 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1234 (Alito, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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 Several of these guardians of our precious liberty are 
found within Article II.49 Concurrent with establishing the duties 
and responsibilities of the Executive Branch, and empowering the 
office of the Chief Executive, the Article equally restrains presi-
dential ambitions, by assuring the chief magistrate stays re-
sponsive to the popular will.50 Both courts and commentators have 
lauded Article II as one of the Constitution’s most noble provisions, 
guaranteeing accountability to the People.51 
 Prominent among Article II’s critical subcomponents is 
the Appointments Clause, a “structural safeguard” that tethers 
federal officers to the “sovereign power of the United States, and 
thus to the people.”52 Above all else, the Appointments Clause 
insists that those who wield executive authority remain “ac-
countable to political force and the will of the people.”53 
 The requirements of the Appointments Clause are “among 
the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme” 
and are “designed to preserve political accountability relative to 
important Government assignments.”54 In regulating the manner 
of taking office, the proviso assures that appointees are “accountable 
to the President, who himself is accountable to the people.”55 
                                                                                                             
49 See U.S. CONST. art. II. 
50 See id. § 2. 
51 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential 
Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 705 (2003) (quotations 
and brackets omitted)). 
52 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (Briscoe, J., 
concurring). 
53 Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991). The 
Founders indicated that dependence upon the People is a primary means of 
controlling the federal government from excess. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, 
at 356 (James Madison) (Wright ed., 1961); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 136 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004). In his majes-
tic paean to American freedom, de Tocqueville eloquently posits the following: 
“In order to maintain the republican form of government, it was essential that 
the [President] ... be subject to the national will.” To that end, de Tocqueville 
observes that the Senate oversees the Chief Executive “in the distribution of 
appointments, so that he can neither corrupt nor be corrupted.” Id. And, finally, 
this erudite witness to America’s early years adds the following gem, quite 
apropos to the instant controversy: The President “ought to be left as free as 
possible to choose his own agents and to dismiss them at will.” Id. at 146. 
54 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 663 (1997). 
55 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito, 
J., concurring).  
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 Accountability is maintained by the Appointments Clause 
in the following manner: officers of the United States are ap-
pointed by the President, who answers to the People.56 When the 
electorate takes exception to the action of an executive officer, 
they protest to the Chief Executive who they elected, and she 
must then inquire of the appointee.57 This is how the chain of 
responsibility operates, and the unitary and uniform execution 
of the law secured.58 
 With regard to the relevant text of the Appointments Clause, 
its most visible segment is well known to most Americans. The 
President is empowered, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, to nominate and appoint ambassadors, “ministers” (cabinet 
level department heads in more modern terms), “Judges of the 
[S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.”59 
It is unassailable that all officers of the United States must be 
appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.60 
 Not as high profile, but nevertheless at the eye of the con-
stitutional tempest which is the subject of this Article, the Ap-
pointments Clause makes further provision that Congress may, 
by law, “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.”61 
 Distilled to its essence, and highly germane to the instant 
discussion, Article II posits the foregoing as an alternative to the 
more cumbersome (and, dare we say, more politically contentious) 
process of presidential nomination subject to senatorial oversight.62 
Presuming a statutory grant, the Chief Executive, as well as de-
partment heads and the courts, enjoy the inherent authority to 
emplace lesser office-holders.63 
                                                                                                             
56 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2. 
57 See id. 
58 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting). 
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
60 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 (1976) (holding Federal Election 
Commissioners performing significant governmental duties pursuant to public 
law were properly classified as “officers of the United States” but had failed to 
attain office in conformity with the Appointments Clause). 
61 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
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 At the end of the day, the Appointments Clause provides 
meaningful assurance that officers of the United States do not 
elude the reach of the Chief Executive, and, thereby, the People.64 
That is, the Appointments Clause, textually speaking. How it has 
been interpreted and applied is our next topic. 
A. Free Enterprise Fund 
 In the main, the epicenter of the high Court’s Appoint-
ments Clause jurisprudence is occupied by two fairly modern 
landmarks. Given such, we shall posit these cornerstones first, 
as the foundation of our analysis. 
 In contemporary Article II case law, it is beyond argument 
that Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board65 stands preeminent in guaranteeing separation of 
powers and checks and balances. 
 For nearly a decade, Free Enterprise Fund has been the pivot 
upon which Appointments Clause controversies have turned.66 Its 
precepts constitute a significant portion of “the best guidance we 
have about the original and enduring meaning of Article II.”67 
 Appropriately enough for this writing, this first crucial 
landmark is itself rooted in yet another financial crisis of recent 
vintage. The holding of Free Enterprise Fund can be directly traced 
to the accounting industry reforms made in the early 2000s, 
subsequent to the scandalous doings of Enron, WorldCom, and 
similar nefarious corporations being revealed to an outraged 
investor class.68 To counteract the blatant financial reporting 
trickery found in those ignominious cases, Congress promulgat-
ed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).69 For all intents and purposes, 
                                                                                                             
64 See id. 
65 See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010). 
66 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I ), 
839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 155 
(D.C. Cir. 2018).  
67 PHH II, 881 F.3d at 155 n.13 (Henderson, J., dissenting); see, e.g., PHH I, 
839 F.3d at 7, vacated and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
68 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484. 
69 See id. 
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the legislation was a massive auditing reform law calling for 
stricter oversight of the accounting profession.70 
 The legislation also created the respondent above named, 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the “PCAOB” 
(colloquially pronounced “Peek-A-Boo”), to administer SOX’s new 
regime of registering all public accounting firms that audit pub-
licly traded companies, regimenting their standards of practice, 
and imposing rigorous oversight to assure their compliance.71 
 The PCAOB was not without its challengers, however, 
and these opponents set out to stop the Board in its tracks.72 The 
chosen form of attack was to invoke the Appointments Clause of 
Article II of the Constitution.73 
 As Chief Justice Roberts explains in Free Enterprise Fund, 
the Appointments Clause authorizes the President to appoint two 
classes of officers within the Executive Branch to assist in exe-
cuting the laws of the United States.74 The first grouping of ap-
pointees is familiar, consisting of ambassadors, cabinet members, 
and the like (such as Article III jurists), usually called “principal 
officers,” whom the President appoints with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.75 
 The second set of Executive Branch adjuncts is comprised 
of so-called “inferior officers,” whose defining attributes are that 
they exercise significant authority in executing the laws of the 
land, yet nonetheless remain accountable to the Oval Office—in 
plain English, the President can fire them at will.76 The latter 
point cannot be underestimated, for placing these persons be-
yond the Chief Executive’s power of recall is an irredeemable 
constitutional error.77 
 Finally, there is an added nuance of the Appointments 
Clause, specifically that department heads (essentially, cabinet 
members and agency chiefs) and the federal courts enjoy a similar 
                                                                                                             
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 487. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
76 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493. 
77 Id. 
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power to invest their own “inferior officers” with authority to 
assist the former in executing the laws of the land.78 
 And here is where Free Enterprise Fund found the fatal 
flaw in constituting the PCAOB’s membership. Chief Justice 
Roberts observed how the five Board members were selected by 
the SEC, not appointed by the President.79 Once in place, a Board 
member could only be removed “for good cause.”80 Another key 
link in the chain of Free Enterprise Fund’s Appointments Clause 
analysis was that the Commissioners of the SEC itself, the ones 
who appoint the PCAOB members, likewise cannot be terminated, 
except “for good cause.”81 Chief Justice Roberts characterized 
this as, not just one, but two levels of “tenure” shielding PCAOB 
members from dismissal by the Chief Executive.82 
 This attribute of the PCAOB led to its downfall.83 The Ap-
pointments Clause is predicated upon the notion (as articulated by 
Founder James Madison while serving in the First Congress) that 
only the Chief Executive holds the executive power accorded by 
the Constitution, and part and parcel of her accountability to the 
People in exercising that power is the unrestricted ability to dis-
miss appointees who are inadequate to the task of executing the 
Nation’s laws.84 
 In other words, the Appointments Clause does not merely 
regulate the manner of appointments; it assures that office-
holders shall be accountable to the President who commissioned 
them, and ergo, the citizens who elected the Chief Executive.85 
 Accordingly, the Free Enterprise Fund Court found the 
SOX methodology for constituting the PCAOB antithetical to the 
rigors of the Appointments Clause.86 Moreover, the liberty inter-
est protected by the Article II proviso was further confounded by 
the two levels of insulation the board members enjoyed.87 
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 This tenure protection made the PCAOB fundamentally 
untethered to the President’s will, given the clear inability of the 
President to exercise her prerogative of recall.88 The resultant 
lack of accountability to the President only exacerbated the con-
stitutional infirmity.89 
 While the high Court left the vast bulk of SOX undis-
turbed,90 this assertion of the Appointments Clause’s requirements 
vis-à-vis the PCAOB set in place a vital imperative for the con-
stitutional delegation of administrative authority, cutting across 
a wide swath of regulatory agencies, and not just the ones tasked 
to administer the securities laws.91 Indeed, Free Enterprise Fund 
continues to emerge as a touchstone in cases questioning the 
apportionment of governmental power within the Executive and 
other Branches.92 
 We will soon see that the disavowed parameters for ap-
pointments to the PCAOB at issue in Free Enterprise Fund bore 
a striking similarity to the appointive process for the Commis-
sion’s ALJs.93 That justifies our care in expositing Free Enter-
prise Fund as a linchpin in the imbroglio that challenged the 
authority of the SEC’s adjudicators, for those similarities were 
exploited to no end by those opposing the agency’s jurisdiction.94 
B. Freytag 
 Our second high Court precedent was one that somewhat 
presaged the coming of Free Enterprise Fund, albeit nearly two 
decades earlier.95 In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
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91 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (bankruptcy judges do not 
enjoy the full judicial power of the United States because, inter alia, they are 
appointees of the Article III courts); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 
(1988) (as one of the seminal cases in the never-ending tug of war over em-
powering “inferior officers” within the three competing branches, including 
ongoing divisiveness over the role of judges within the Article III branch). 
92 See Stern, 564 U.S. at 503; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696–97. 
93 See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 868 (1991). 
94 See id. 
95 One might even venture it provided the rule for decision. See Am. Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238 (2013) (Scalia, J.) (“Truth 
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the plaintiff was a taxpayer aggrieved by the IRS’s assessment 
of additional tax due.96 More importantly, this plaintiff went so 
far as to challenge the very constitutionality of the judicial pro-
cess whereby his tax was determined.97 Freytag’s argument was 
one we are already familiar with: his main contention was that 
the judicial officer hearing his controversy exercised significant 
authority under federal law, yet the mode the judicial officer’s 
appointment, and that of his fellows, did not comport with the 
requisites of the Appointments Clause.98 
 Taking center stage here were the officials entitled Special 
Trial Judges (STJs), effectively adjuncts to the United States Tax 
Court, a body itself long deemed to be an Article I “legislative 
court.”99 Indeed, in its arguments for confirming the validity of 
the existing system, the government emphasized the supposedly 
subordinate role of the STJs, calling them merely assistants to 
the actual Tax Court jurists in such matters as taking evidence, 
drafting proposed findings of fact and opinions, and other purely 
ministerial tasks.100 In sum, and despite the taxpayer’s protesta-
tions to the contrary, the government held fast to its claim that 
the STJs were little more than glorified clerks.101 
 The Supreme Court ruled otherwise, and, in taking the tax-
payer’s side, carefully parsed the exact duties of these judicial 
officers.102 STJs, noted the high Court, take testimony, conduct 
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to 
enforce compliance with discovery orders, among other things.103 
In addition, the very office in which they serve is a creation of 
statute, and the precise tasks, salary, and means of appointment 
for STJs are likewise specified by law.104 
 Combining the foregoing powers of the STJs with the means 
by which they attain and keep office, it was no surprise that the 
                                                                                                             
to tell, our decision in AT&T Mobility all but resolves this case.” (citing AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011))). 
96 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868. 
97 Id. at 872. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 880–81. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 881–82. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 881. 
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Court concluded that these judicial helpmates “exercise signifi-
cant discretion” in their everyday duties.105 Thus, the Supreme 
Court had no hesitancy in categorizing the STJs as “inferior 
officers” for Article II purposes.106 
 But leaving nothing to chance, Freytag did not end there. 
It contrasted the STJs to “special masters,” yet another variety 
of judicial appointee found across the landscape of the federal court 
system.107 The role of special master is, to be sure, not estab-
lished by statute, nor does the law clearly delineate the duties and 
obligations of the office.108 Special masters serve the Article III 
bench on a temporary and ad hoc basis or, as the Justices put it so 
well, are “episodic” in the frequency of their service to the Judicial 
Branch.109 This effectively forecloses any characterization of special 
masters as “inferior officers,” whereas, in sharp contradistinc-
tion, it underscores the conclusion that STJs are even more de-
serving of that title, with all of its constitutional implications.110 
 Having thus set forth the appreciable powers of the STJs, 
and having further placed them in exquisite counterpoise to special 
masters and the latter’s comparatively limited purview, the Su-
preme Court readily concluded that the former exercised “signif-
icant discretion” under the law, as that term is understood for 
Article II purposes.111 That established, the Court declared that 
the STJs were, in fact, “inferior officers,” as Article II jurispru-
dence classifies that title.112 Therefore, such persons “must be 
properly appointed” pursuant to the strictures of the Appoint-
ments Clause.113 And since this helpmate to the Tax Court had 
not attained office in a manner consonant with Article II, his 
adjudication of the plaintiff’s tax liability was invalidated.114  
 In sum, Freytag was the trailblazer towards the primacy 
of Free Enterprise Fund in resolving contemporary disputes over 
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the scope and application of the Appointments Clause. Given the 
role it was to eventually play in resolving the instant controversy 
over SEC ALJs, we urge mindfulness of Freytag’s carefully 
drawn distinctions amongst different classifications of adjudicators, 
and the sharp implications for the matter at hand. 
C. Germaine 
 Before departing entirely from the realm of modern Ap-
pointments Clause jurisprudence, we are required to briefly explore 
a Reconstruction era holding that presaged some of the current 
Article II controversy. Why reach back some one hundred and 
forty years to a ruling that could not have possibly conceived of 
today’s Administrative State? The direct answer is because the 
high Court itself called upon this venerable edict to help resolve 
the controversy most recently at the bar. 
 United States v. Germaine presents the sordid tale of a ci-
vilian surgeon accused of extorting monies from the pension 
applicants he was charged with examining.115 One aspect of his 
appeal was that the avaricious medico had been prosecuted un-
der a law calling for the fine or imprisonment of any officer of 
the United States found guilty of committing extortion under color 
of his office.116 The obvious prerequisite to a successful prosecu-
tion thereunder was that the defendant actually qualify as a 
bona fide officer of the United States.117 Seeking to avoid that 
penalty, the defendant contended he enjoyed no such status.118 To 
the contrary, Germaine alleged his appointment by the Commis-
sioner of Pensions was not compliant with the procedures man-
dated by Article II.119  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller made short 
shrift of the entire affair.120 Obviously, the defendant had not 
been appointed by the President or the courts of law.121 Adhering 
strictly to the plain text of Article II, the sole question remaining 
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was whether the Commissioner of Pensions was the head of a 
department.122 As he was not, it was clear to the Justices that 
neither this defendant nor anyone holding office by virtue of the 
Commissioner’s order could be deemed an officer of the United 
States.123 Since Germaine did not qualify as an officer of the United 
States, he could not be prosecuted under a statute prohibiting 
malfeasance by such appointees.124 
 Relevant to today’s Appointments Clause challenge to the 
power of SEC ALJs, we may draw the following lessons from 
Germaine. First, “[t]he Constitution ... very clearly divides all its 
officers into two classes.”125 Principal officers must be nominated 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.126 All others, de-
noted as inferior officers, may attain office as appointees of the 
President, the courts of law, or the heads of departments, if 
Congress so provides by statute.127 
 Notably, the Germaine Court justified this more conven-
ient mode of appointment as the Constitution foreseeing the day 
“when officers became numerous, and sudden removals neces-
sary.”128 One can only applaud the prescience of the Germaine 
Court, not to mention the Founders, for predicting the present-
day Administrative State. 
 Be that as it may, the Justices of that bygone era were 
unequivocal in one other key finding. “[T]here can be but little 
doubt” that the foregoing two methodologies are the exclusive 
means by which one attains the vaunted status of Officer of the 
United States.129 
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 Hereinabove, we have not only illuminated the Article II 
precedents instrumental in deciding Lucia, we now have a greater 
appreciation for the high Court’s fidelity to the Appointments 
Clause as a guarantor of accountability, and, thereby, liberty. While 
all this is a necessary precursor to the review which is soon to 
follow, we must remember that the latest addition to the Court’s 
Article II jurisprudence traveled a complex and arduous trail of 
litigation, which we are duty bound to explore. 
 For while the ultimate focus of this Article shall be the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia, that new landmark cannot 
be rightly contemplated in isolation. Our analysis is informed by 
the many conflicting lower court opinions that preceded the high 
Court’s final ruling here. 
 Cases similar to Lucia were first the subject of vastly dif-
ferent approaches taken by trial judges, and then the decisions 
of various appellate tribunals took vectors in a direction totally 
contrary to that of the Supreme Court’s eventual ruling.130 This 
newest high Court pronouncement can only be considered in light 
of its jurisprudential roots. It could be said that the saga which 
is Lucia is a play in four acts. Accordingly, we expound upon it 
in that fashion. 
III. ACT ONE: THE TRIAL COURTS 
 The road to a Supreme Court landmark is typically pre-
dictable and linear. It commences when a substantial number of 
federal district courts issue dissimilar rulings with regard to the 
same controversy. The discord is heightened when a significant 
number of circuit courts, sitting in review, declare their own 
views, presumably contrary to each other. Warring factions soon 
take shape, until the highest court in the land steps in, and ends 
the internecine controversy by promulgating its own edict. 
                                                                                                             
United States. Yet if the Supreme Court of 1878 could make such notable distinc-
tions as to the infrastructure of the then-nascent federal bureaucracy, can we 
do any less than apply that wisdom to our current Article II controversy? 
Even then, in post–Civil War America, the Supreme Court found “nine-tenths 
of the persons rendering service to the government undoubtedly are” mere 
hirelings, not officers holding their rank pursuant to the Appointments Clause. 
Id. at 509. 
130 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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 Notably, Lucia did not precisely follow that familiar pat-
tern.131 Its contours first took shape with a remarkably small 
number of trial court decisions, most of which coalesced around 
a common point of argument.132 In time, said argument became 
the focal point of the high Court’s attention, and therefore the 
gravamen of its ultimate holding.133 
 Yet, at the appellate court level, a near majority of circuit 
panels rejected the postulations of the lower courts, and moved 
in an entirely different direction.134 In truth, two—and only two—
federal tribunals embarked upon paths which placed them in the 
requisite counterpoise.135 Thus, the conflict finally resolved by 
the Supreme Court entailed contentiousness between a mere 
fraction of the more than one dozen circuit courts of appeals.136 
That, in and of itself, is unusual. 
 Given that Lucia did not track in a manner customary to 
the evolution of a high Court landmark, we are compelled to first 
sample, ever so briefly, the decisions of selective district courts 
that set the nascent controversy on the path to its final adjudi-
cation by the Justices. 
 Lucia’s early roots were embodied in district court rulings 
addressing challenges to the SEC’s newly expanded prerogative 
to have enforcement cases presided over by the agency’s in-house 
adjudicators.137 Respondents named in such proceedings actively 
resisted having administrative law judges hear the Commis-
sion’s charges against them.138 
 One of the first such cases, Hill v. SEC, presented a plain-
tiff of a different sort.139 Hill described himself as a real estate 
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developer.140 Thus, he was not a securities industry professional, 
normally subject to SEC jurisdiction.141 After he made nearly 
three-quarters of a million dollars transacting in the stock of a 
takeover target, the Commission accused Hill of indulging in the 
wrongful act of insider trading.142 
 The plaintiff disputed the authority of the SEC ALJ over-
seeing his proceeding.143 Arguing before Judge Leigh Martin May, 
Mr. Hill contended that the Commission’s administrative law 
judges were officers of the United States, yet had attained office 
in contravention of the Appointments Clause.144 “Not so,” coun-
tered the agency; “the SEC’s ALJs are mere employees.”145 
 District Judge May sided with the plaintiff.146 Her touch-
stone was Freytag’s postulation that the exercise of “significant 
authority” was the litmus test for deciding if an Executive Branch 
functionary is an officer of the United States, subject to the rigors 
of the Appointments Clause.147 
 For all these reasons, Hill was among the first of the lower 
courts to hold that the Commission’s in-house adjudicators held 
office in violation of the Appointments Clause.148 
 Notably, Hill offered a means to end the evolving contro-
versy before it erupted into a full-blown constitutional crisis. 
District Judge May suggested that the full Commission, collectively 
a head of a department as contemplated by Article II, nominate 
and appoint each and every SEC ALJ.149 But, lacking any such 
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initiative from the agency, Hill forbade the agency’s adjudicator 
from conducting further proceedings involving this plaintiff.150 
 Whilst Hill emanated from southerly climes, it provided a 
template for resolution adopted by certain federal trial courts 
within walking distance of Wall Street itself.151 The case in 
point—Duka v. SEC152—in actuality comprised an interconnected 
set of rulings, which willingly joined Hill’s assessment of the 
burgeoning controversy as a matter of constitutional import.153 
 Duka presented an industry professional accused by the 
SEC of wrongdoing in disseminating inaccurate and misleading 
credit ratings, to the detriment of investors who relied upon 
such reports when transacting in the ranked securities.154 This 
respondent sought to enjoin the Commission from further pur-
suit.155 Duka’s claim—like the one interposed in Hill—was an 
allegation that the Appointments Clause had been violated in 
empowering the agency’s in-house adjudicators.156 
 The end result was markedly the same.157 In a sequence 
of interlocked opinions, District Judge Berman eventually con-
cluded that SEC ALJs do, in fact, exercise “significant authority,” 
as that term is utilized in the lexicon of the Appointments 
Clause.158 Key to the trial court’s determination was its recogni-
tion that the Commission’s administrative law judges do much 
of what ordinary judges do on an everyday basis.159 
 Accordingly, Duka II easily resolved the Article II ques-
tion by finding that the agency’s adjudicators were, indeed, of-
ficers of the United States, and therefore required a nomination 
compliant with the strictures of the Appointments Clause.160 
These rulings compelled the Duka II court to halt the SEC’s 
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enforcement proceeding, given the constitutional defect in how 
the presiding ALJ attained office.161 
 Notably, this New York district jurist took up the sugges-
tion of his colleague from the Northern District of Georgia, to wit, 
that the Commission remedy the entire matter by having the 
“[h]eads of [d]epartments,” that being the Commissioners them-
selves, appoint the SEC ALJs anew, thereby correcting the net-
tlesome Article II violation.162 Regrettably, as in Hill, the agency 
failed to act upon the court’s prompting.163 
 At this juncture, it must be remembered that federal trial 
judges are not bound by the decisions of their peers, even those 
from within the same judicial district.164 That fundamental truth 
was exemplified in the instant controversy’s early stages.165 Spe-
cifically, yet another district jurist, also hailing from the same 
vicinage as Duka II, issued a holding inapposite to both the 
aforementioned and Hill.166 
 This contrary decision was the first iteration of Tilton v. 
SEC167 Replicating the now familiar pattern, a financial profes-
sional and her affiliated companies were subjected to Commis-
sion action, based upon the SEC’s allegation that they had, jointly 
and severally, violated the federal securities law.168 This plaintiff 
counterattacked, alleging that the agency’s administrative law 
judge took office in violation of Article II; therefore, the Commis-
sion’s enforcement case should be enjoined from continuing before 
the in-house adjudicator.169 
 Taking a different tack from her brethren, District Judge 
Ronnie Abrams disagreed with both the plaintiff before her, and 
with the rulings issued in Hill and Duka II.170 To be sure, this 
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New York jurist, presiding in a forum within a stone’s throw of Wall 
Street, was not unmindful of the plea of a constitutional defect.171 
 Notwithstanding the assertion of an Appointments Clause 
violation, the court in Tilton I looked to the fact that the plaintiff 
retained a statutory right to have an appellate court review any 
sanction decreed by the SEC.172 Given the undisputed availability 
of a subsequent hearing before a circuit tribunal, Tilton I refused 
to prevent the Commission from proceeding with the enforce-
ment action.173 To be sure, the highlight of Tilton I is its staunch 
refusal to embrace the Appointments Clause challenge proffered 
by similarly situated plaintiffs in Hill and Duka II. 
 We pause here for a moment of contemplation. The con-
troversy, which was to percolate through the federal courts, and 
conclude with the new landmark of Lucia, commenced with a 
relatively small cross-section of trial courts at odds with each 
other on the ostensible constitutional crisis. 
 Some halted Commission enforcement proceedings, out of 
recognition of the alleged Appointments Clause violation.174 
Others set to the side the purported constitutional infirmity.175 
 At that time, we commented that the internecine struggle 
would not go away soon, nor would it depart neatly.176 We accu-
rately predicted that only Supreme Court intervention could restore 
order.177 While grateful for that small bit of prescience, no one 
could have foretold the various directions the instant controversy 
would take.178 
 Having submitted the above for your edification, we are now 
able to turn to the circugit conflict, in its variegated form, which 
ultimately led to the fresh landmark we now know as Lucia. 
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IV. ACT TWO: THE CIRCUIT COURTS AVOIDING THE 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE QUESTION 
 As already postulated herein above, the essence of this 
controversy is the constitutional question as to whether admin-
istrative law judges of the SEC are officers of the United States 
and attain office in a manner compliant with the Appointments 
Clause of Article II. The conventional wisdom has long been that, 
for questions of constitutional magnitude, the Supreme Court 
typically refrains from asserting its prerogative of review until a 
substantial number of the circuit courts of appeals have weighed 
in on the issue at hand. 
 That is not precisely what happened with respect to the 
instant controversy.179 To be sure, in a following section, we 
shall exposit the two diametrically opposed circuit decisions that 
led to the ultimate resolution of Lucia. However, we duly note 
that a substantial number of circuit tribunals, when asked to 
resolve the very Appointments Clause challenge at the heart of 
Lucia, declined to do so.180 These appellate courts essentially 
ignored the Article II claim, and resolved the litigation before 
them on more prosaic grounds.181 
 In order to fully comprehend Lucia, we must provide some 
discussion of those circuit decisions, since it cannot be denied 
they made their own contribution to the abovementioned landmark, 
albeit by indirect means. However, because of their contrarian 
approach, and the further reason that we do not wish to detract 
from Lucia’s true underpinnings, we can be brief in expositing 
these cases. 
 Moreover, these circuits, which chose to resolve their re-
spective cases by means other than resorting to the text of the 
Appointments Clause, comprise a fair cross-section of the federal 
judiciary.182 
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 Chronologically speaking, the first tribunal to be heard 
from was the venerable Seventh Circuit.183 In Bebo v. SEC, that 
court deflected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to the au-
thority of a SEC ALJ to hear the proceeding brought against her 
by the Commission.184 
 Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Hamilton found that 
jurisdiction was lacking, as the plaintiff had not yet exhausted 
her options.185 “Bebo will be able to raise her constitutional claims 
in this circuit or in the D.C. Circuit” pursuant to the statutory 
review scheme provided by Congress.186 Per force, this would in-
clude the assertion that the administrative law judge then hear-
ing her case held office in violation of the Appointments Clause.187 
Put another way, said the Seventh Circuit, Bebo’s Article II 
challenge was preserved until she sought out review by a federal 
appeals court.188 
 Not long after Bebo was decided, the August Second Circuit 
added to the dialogue with its holding in Tilton v. SEC189 There 
is no need to regurgitate the court’s reasoning here, comprehensive 
as it might have been. 
 Suffice to say, the New York–based tribunal ruled con-
sistently with its brethren in Chicago, finding the plaintiff’s Ap-
pointments Clause claim was premature.190 Circuit Judge Sack 
opined on behalf of the panel that Tilton, a securities industry 
professional, was required to raise her constitutional challenge 
                                                                                                             
183 See id. at 1171 n.2; see also Bebo, 799 F.3d at 765. 
184 Bebo, 799 F.3d at 765, 767. In that administrative enforcement case, the 
SEC charged Bebo, a former CEO, of manipulating her company’s books and rec-
ords, and making false representations to auditors and the Commission itself. 
Notably, the ALJ had yet to rule on the case at the time Bebo filed her lawsuit. 
Id. at 767. 
185 Id. at 767, 775. 
186 Id. at 767–68. 
187 Id. at 768. 
188 Id. at 774. For the sake of explicitness, the original—and only—panel 
decision in Bebo was issued on August 24, 2015. The Seventh Circuit denied 
rehearing and rehearing en banc on November 5th of that same year. Id. at 765. 
We deem that later ruling as immaterial in fixing a chronology. Accordingly, 
Bebo rightfully holds first position, as compared to Jarkesy v. SEC, which was 
decided on September 29, 2015. Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
189 Tilton v. SEC (Tilton II ), 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 2187 (2017). 
190 Id. at 291. 
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within the “exclusive” review infrastructure created by Congress.191 
In so doing, the Second Circuit likewise did not approach the 
Article II issue that was to become the focus of Lucia.192 
 Consistency was maintained amongst the federal tribunals 
with Hill v. SEC,193 a ruling issued only days after Tilton II ap-
peared.194 There, the Eleventh Circuit joined its sister circuits in 
declining jurisdiction,195 and directed the subjects of an enforcement 
proceeding to first exhaust their rights of review, as provided by 
Congress in the statutory scheme of the Exchange Act.196 
 As the author of the opinion, Circuit Judge Pryor distin-
guished the case at bar from the “precarious position the Supreme 
Court found unacceptable” in Free Enterprise Fund.197 In this 
fashion, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the constitutional challenge 
brought by Hill pursuant to the Appointments Clause.198 
 The circle of appellate courts declining to entertain the 
constitutional arguments of respondents challenging the power 
of SEC ALJs was completed by the Fourth Circuit in Bennett v. 
SEC.199 By this late date,200 the cohesion of these geographically 
diverse tribunals was such that the unanimous panel commenced 
the opinion with a declaration that the Fourth Circuit was now 
conjoined with its kin.201 Further discussion exemplifying this 
union of the courts of appeals was relegated to a parenthetical.202 
 As a point of additional interest, Bennett likewise observed 
that the plaintiff’s theory of unconstitutionality in the appoint-
ment of the Commission’s adjudicators “reads too much into the 
Free Enterprise Court’s conclusion,” which this tribunal found was 
                                                                                                             
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
194 Tilton II was decided June 1, 2016. 824 F.3d at 276. Hill was rendered 
on June 17, 2016. 825 F.3d at 1236. 
195 Hill, 825 F.3d at 1241. 
196 Id. at 1237. As to the underlying case brought by the SEC before the ALJ, 
Hill, a real estate developer, was accused of profiting on inside information per-
taining to a corporate merger. Id. at 1239. 
197 Id. at 1247 (citations omitted). 
198 See id. at 1247–48. 
199 See generally Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2016). 
200 Bennett was issued on December 16, 2016. Id. at 174. 
201 Id. at 176. 
202 Id. at 183 n.7. 
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factually distinguishable.203 Explicating the last comment, Circuit 
Judge Duncan pointed out that “Bennett is already embroiled in 
an enforcement proceeding.”204 The plaintiff did not incur any 
additional risks by having her constitutional challenge heard as 
part and parcel of the nominal statutory review process.205 
 Thus, as 2016 drew to a close, there was apparent una-
nimity amongst the circuit courts of appeals on the matter of 
Appointments Clause challenges to Commission ALJs holding 
office, and presiding over the agency’s enforcement actions.206 After 
all, the D.C., Seventh, Second, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits 
had held the line, refusing to hear the constitutional complaints 
made by the subjects of SEC proceedings.207 
 By the straightforward expedient of directing such per-
sons to return to the agency’s adjudicators, and counseling that 
their Article II claims were preserved there and in the subsequent 
review process, nearly half of the Nation’s appellate courts had 
successfully—and, one could venture, appropriately—avoided 
resolving a question of constitutional magnitude.208 
                                                                                                             
203 Id. at 182, 186. 
204 Id. at 186. The plaintiff, the founder of an investment firm, was charged by 
the Commission with materially misstating assets under management, falsi-
fying performance results, and related securities law violations. Id. at 177. 
205 Id. at 186. 
206 See supra text accompanying note 204. 
207 We relegate to a parenthetical what might otherwise be deemed the pi-
oneering decision of the D.C. Circuit on the controversy at hand, the case captioned 
Jarkesy v. SEC. Decided on September 29, 2014, Jarkesy presents a pattern to 
be oft-repeated before the federal tribunals in the next year and one half. 
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiff there managed 
the general partner of two hedge funds and was accused of securities fraud in 
a Commission enforcement proceeding. Id. at 13. Seeking to derail the admin-
istrative action by ousting the SEC of jurisdiction, he asserted, inter alia, Due 
Process and Equal Protection claims. Id. at 14. Significant to our central pur-
pose here, Jarkesy did not interpose an Appointments Clause challenge to the 
ALJ’s power. Therefore, while several tribunals claimed fellowship with the 
D.C. Circuit when issuing their own subsequent rulings on the power of SEC 
ALJs, in truth Jarkesy never addressed the Article II aspects of the instant 
controversy. While the D.C. Circuit is often credited by its brethren as a constit-
tuent member of the then-emerging majority, the fact is Jarkesy is distinguish-
able, and thus cannot be more than mentioned in passing when discussing the 
Appointments Clause challenge that defined the heart of the matter at hand. 
208 But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 375 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (when constitutional questions are unavoidable, 
the Court must decide them) (quotations and citations omitted). 
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 Yet all that was to change mere days later, as the waning 
days of 2016 brought forth the first opposing pole of a controver-
sy, once thought to be dormant, but now entering the full flower 
of contentiousness.209 We now come to the limited, but irrecon-
cilable, rift between the circuits which set the stage for Lucia. 
V. ACT THREE: TWO CIRCUITS DO BATTLE OVER THE 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
 As already stipulated, a near majority of circuit courts of 
appeals had successfully avoided divisiveness by deftly sidestep-
ping the Appointments Clause questions put before them. Then, two 
tribunals clashed head on, giving rise to what would eventually 
become the Supreme Court’s Article II landmark in Lucia.210 
 We now examine the two—and only two—appellate deci-
sions that gave rise to the internecine conflict, now concluded, at 
least for the time being. 
A. Lucia Companies I and II 
 For reason that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia oc-
cupies the apex of this Article, it would be wasteful to expend much 
effort in discussing the appellate court decision that was reversed 
and remanded by the Justices. Therefore, while reserving the bulk 
of our dissertation for the high Court’s reasoning, we note, but 
briefly, the holding which preceded the new landmark. 
 In Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, a panel of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to overturn a Commission 
final order imposing sanctions upon an investment adviser.211 
The petitioning entities raised the now-familiar Appointments 
Clause challenge to the power of the SEC ALJ who initially 
heard and decided the underlying enforcement proceeding.212 
 First, the panel devoted many pages to a detailed analysis 
of the statutory predicate for the Commission’s enforcement power, 
                                                                                                             
209 See generally Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016); Raymond 
J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC (Lucia Cos. I ), 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition 
for review denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
210 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
211 Lucia Cos. I, 832 F.3d at 277. 
212 Id. at 280. 
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its ability to delegate, and the role of its in-house adjudica-
tors.213 Then, turning to the petitioners’ contentions that the 
ALJ presiding over their case did not hold office in conformity with 
Article II,214 the August tribunal began—and ended—with a 
singular observation. 
 The decisive point here, wrote Circuit Judge Rogers, is 
whether the SEC’s administrative law judge had the power to 
issue final decisions.215 Since he did not, the panel ruled the 
agency’s in-house jurist was not an officer of the United States, 
and thus there was no constitutional infirmity in the manner in 
which the ALJ took office.216 
 The tribunal found it conclusive that the full Commission 
“retained full decision-making powers,” and that body “alone 
issues final orders.”217 As simple as that, the D.C. Circuit handily 
refuted the Appointments Clause claim.218 
 Nearly an entire year passed before the D.C. Circuit is-
sued the penultimate decree which primed the matter for final 
                                                                                                             
213 Id. at 281–83. 
214 Id. at 283–85. 
215 See id. at 285. 
216 See id. Contra Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2017), 
where the Fifth Circuit stayed the order of a Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration ALJ on the grounds that the adjudicator attained office in violation 
of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 299, 304. Duly noting Lucia Cos. I and II, the 
tribunal took cognizance of the intercircuit rift. Id. at 300–01. Holding that the 
ALJ employed by the banking regulator exercised all the attributes of an of-
ficer of the United States, albeit as an inferior office-holder, the southerly circuit 
had no difficulty in finding the lack of compliance with the Appointments 
Clause nullified the adjudicator’s directive. Id. at 302–03. Writing for the 
panel, Circuit Judge Owen, as joined by Judges Jones and Clement of that 
prestigious bench, opined the fact that ALJs are often directed and super-
vised by a superior is “more relevant to the distinction between principal and 
inferior officers.” It does not, however, diminish one bit the appointee’s Arti-
cle II status as an officer of some stripe. Id. at 303 (quotation and footnote 
omitted). It can be stated that Burgess is firmly grounded in the notion that 
the ability of an appointee to render final decisions on behalf of the United 
States has relevance to distinguishing principal officers from inferior officers 
but has no bearing on differentiating officers of either classification from mere 
employees. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1997). 
217 Lucia Cos. I, 823 F.3d at 286. 
218 The remainder of Lucia Cos. I likewise rejected the petitioners’ chal-
lenges to the finding of liability and choice of sanctions decreed by the SEC’s 
ALJ. Id. at 289–96. 
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adjudication by the Supreme Court.219 In a per curium judgment, 
“an equally divided court” denied further review at the circuit 
level.220 The case at bar was now ready to be placed before the 
Nation’s highest tribunal.221 
 But first, it needed a conflicting ruling to be set in opposi-
tion. A panel of a circuit court nearly fifteen hundred miles distant 
from the Nation’s capital soon provided the necessary counterpoint, 
and it is that contrarian view that we exposit next.222 
B. Bandimere 
 Bandimere v. SEC came before the courts much like the 
cases which preceded it.223 The SEC alleged that David F. 
Bandimere, a Colorado businessman, had breached various fed-
eral securities laws.224 An administrative law judge assigned by 
the Commission presided over the enforcement proceeding, ruled 
Bandimere was liable as charged, and assessed various punish-
ments against the respondent, including a lifetime ban from 
securities industry.225 
 The full Commission essentially confirmed the decision of 
its ALJ, while simultaneously rejecting Bandimere’s Appointments 
                                                                                                             
219 Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC (Lucia Cos II ), 868 F.3d 1021, 1021 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
220 Id. at 1021. 
221 The denial of further review by the en banc court exemplified the con-
ventional wisdom “that the D.C. Circuit is a ‘AAA baseball team for the Su-
preme Court’s major league.’” Fred Lucas, Here’s What Happened the Last Time 
Democrats Tried to Deny Brett Kavanaugh a Court Seat, THE DAILY SIGNAL 
(July 10, 2018), https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/07/10/heres-what-happened  
-the-last-time-democrats-tried-to-deny-kavanaugh-a-court-seat [https://perma 
.cc/FTY6-5BHT] (quoting Professor Anthony Michael Sabino). Lucia Cos. II 
was adjudged by, among others, then–Circuit Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, and 
Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, mentioned as a possible high Court nominee. 
Not participating in the denial of review was D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick 
B. Garland, nominated to the Supreme Court in the waning days of the Obama 
Administration. Lucia Cos. II, 868 F.3d at 1021. 
222 See generally Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016). 
223 Id. Bandimere was decided on December 27, 2016. Id. at 1168. Even in-
cluding intervening holidays, the Tenth Circuit issued its ruling less than two 
weeks after the Fourth Circuit issued Bennett. Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174, 
174 (4th Cir. 2016). 
224 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171. 
225 Id. 
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Clause challenge.226 Upon the respondent’s petition for re-
view,227 the controversy was submitted to the Tenth Circuit for 
further adjudication.228 
 The Tenth Circuit pronounced its judgment without equivo-
cation.229 In only the second paragraph of its opinion, and citing 
solely to Freytag, this western tribunal firmly declared that the ALJ 
who heard Bandimere’s case “was not constitutionally appointed, 
[and] held his office in violation of the Appointments Clause.”230 
 Circuit Judge Matheson commenced the analysis with an 
overview of the Appointments Clause.231 The proviso, he noted, 
“embodies both separation of powers and checks and balances.”232 
In addition, the Appointments Clause assures accountability, by 
establishing the vital chain between those appointed and the 
elected officials who bestowed the office.233 Relying upon the very 
words of Freytag, the Bandimere court emphasized these con-
straints upon the appointment power were the best guarantee that 
the machinery of government would be accountable to the will of 
the People.234 
                                                                                                             
226 Id. 
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(y)(a)(1). 
228 Bandimere, 844 F.3d. at 1171. As explained previously herein, it was 
Bandimere’s option to seek review before the D.C. Circuit or the Tenth, the latter 
sitting in Denver. Being a Coloradan, the respondent made the obvious choice of 
the tribunal closest to his home. But he chose wisely, since he thereby avoided 
the tribunal from which Jarkesy and Lucia Cos. I emanated, rulings far less 
favorable to his position. 
229 Id. at 1170. 
230 Id. Bandimere opens with these cogent historical observations. It postu-
lated that the Framers could not have foreseen the creature of the adminis-
trative law judge, and, better still, such an appointee presiding at securities 
law enforcement hearings. Nor could the Founders have imagined an Executive 
Branch comprised of more than four million people, most of them employees, 
but some of that bureaucratic army standing apart as officers of the United 
States, be they principal or inferior office-holders “who must be appointed under 
the Appointments Clause.” Id. at 1170 (citation omitted). 
231 Id. at 1172–73. 
232 Id. at 1172; see also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1985) (“The 
Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of 
another.”). 
233 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1172. In various parentheticals, Judge Matheson 
looked to the Federalist documents for supplementary discussion of separation 
of powers, accountability, and checking the President’s authority to populate 
the Executive Branch. Id. at 1172 nn.5–6. 
234 Id. at 1173 (quotation and citation omitted). 
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 There followed an in-depth discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding those persons found to constitute 
inferior officers of the United States, and an extensive cataloging 
of those positions.235 This was set in counterpoise to Freytag,236 
then punctuated by a notation that SEC ALJs are permitted to 
take office via the Administrative Procedure Act,237 and are the 
proper delegates of the Commission’s lawful functions, pursuant 
to the 1934 Exchange Act.238 Possibly most telling in this discourse 
was the concession by the agency that “its ALJs are not appointed 
by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department.”239 
 All this inexorably led to the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion 
that, as decreed in Freytag, SEC administrative law judges are 
inferior officers of the United States, and they must therefore 
attain their rank via a process congruent with the Appointments 
Clause.240 Since the adjudicator in Bandimere’s case had not, 
the respondent possessed a valid Article II claim.241 But the 
Tenth Circuit had one more critical piece of business to attend 
to. The tribunal was required to address the contrary outcome 
reached by the D.C. Circuit in Lucia Cos. I.242 
 Writing for this western appeals court, Circuit Judge 
Matheson promptly disposed of the matter.243 He opined that the 
appellate bench residing in the Nation’s capital had concluded 
                                                                                                             
235 Id. at 1173–74. 
236 Id. at 1174–76. 
237 Id. at 1174. 
238 Id. at 1177. 
239 Id. at 1176. 
240 Id. at 1179, 1181. 
241 Id. at 1179. Circuit Judge Matheson then summarized the characteris-
tics of the Commission’s in-house judges which compelled categorizing them as 
officers pursuant to the Freytag inquiry. First, the office of SEC ALJ is estab-
lished by statute. Id. Second, those same provisos set forth the duties, salaries, 
and means of appointment of those adjudicators. Id. Third, and most decisive 
as to the issue of proper classification, “SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion” 
in presiding over enforcement proceedings brought by the agency. Id. Among 
other things, these appointees supervise discovery, hear testimony, rule on mo-
tions, preside over hearings, and then issue initial decisions that might well 
transform into final action sanctioned by the Commission. Id. at 1179–80. “In 
sum,” concluded Circuit Judge Matheson, “SEC ALJs closely resemble the STJs 
described in Freytag,” in the main because they exercise important adjudica-
tive functions, not mere ministerial tasks. Id. at 1181.  
242 Id. at 1182. 
243 Id. 
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SEC ALJs are employees, not officers of the United States, pri-
marily because the agency’s administrative law judges cannot 
render final decisions.244 
 “We disagree,” stated the Tenth Circuit, indicating that 
the finality (or purportedly lack thereof) of an ALJ’s ruling is not 
dispositive.245 Once more, and again invoking the teachings of 
Freytag, the Bandimere panel deemed the totality of circum-
stances surrounding the SEC’s ALJs, how they took office, the 
authority they possessed, and, again most especially, the signifi-
cant discretion they exercised in adjudicating securities law cases, 
decreed that these persons were indeed officers of the United 
States.246 In this thoughtful manner, the Tenth Circuit brought 
forth the essence of the disagreement amongst the two warring 
circuits that would soon occupy the Supreme Court. 
 So Bandimere concluded finding that SEC ALJs were, in 
truth, officers of the United States, yet they attained office un-
constitutionally, for reason that the rigors of the Appointments 
Clause had not been satisfied.247 Accordingly, the Commission’s 
final rendering against this respondent was overturned due to 
that constitutional defect.248 Now the die was cast, and a final 
showdown before the Nation’s highest Court appeared to be a 
foregone conclusion.249 
                                                                                                             
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 1182; accord Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 
2017) (appointee still qualifies as an officer even if she lacks final decision-
making authority). 
246 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179–81 (10th Cir. 2016). 
247 Id. at 1181–82. 
248 Id. at 1188. 
249 A few brief notes regarding the supplemental opinions in Bandimere 
are helpful to our continued understanding of the magnitude of the constitu-
tional issue revealed herein. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Briscoe 
emphasized the structural significance of the Appointments Clause, as it “teth-
er[s] key personnel ... to the sovereign power of the United States, and thus to 
the people.” Id. at 1188 (Briscoe, J., concurring). Concomitantly, he stressed 
that the tribunal’s opinion today does not place every ALJ in every federal 
agency in jeopardy, primarily because Freytag, the keystone to the panel’s 
reasoning, made no such sweeping pronouncements. Id. at 1188–89 (Briscoe, 
J., concurring). In sharp contrast, the dissent penned by Circuit Judge McKay 
warned of repercussions from the majority’s holding, describing it as endan-
gering the status of nearly two thousand ALJs at sundry federal agencies, 
and potentially invalidating hundreds of thousands of decisions made annu-
ally. Id. at 1194, 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
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C. Petitioning for Supreme Court Review 
 In ordinary circumstances, commentators have little or no 
need to discuss the petition for certiorari stage of a case which 
subsequently evolves into a Supreme Court landmark. But Lucia’s 
path to the high bench was somewhat exceptional, and therefore 
deserving of a few words of explanation. 
 Very briefly, Mr. Lucia’s plea for high Court review as-
sumed the shape one would expect, given his losses in the court 
below.250 He posited the salient question rather straightforwardly: 
“Whether administrative law judges of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission are Officers of the United States within the 
meaning of the Appointments Clause.”251 
 Far more remarkable was his advocacy contending the 
matter was ripe for review. Mr. Lucia characterized the division 
between Bandimere and his own case as an “intractable” circuit 
split.252 Arguably correct, vis-à-vis the two tribunals in question; 
yet it failed to take cognizance of the many other circuits that 
were not so diametrically opposed.253 
 Nor did this petitioner brook any intermediate outcomes. 
Mr. Lucia foresaw only one resolution.254 “The question presented 
is binary; one of those two decisions must be wrong.”255 Certainly, 
nothing unusual in a petitioner’s strident advocacy, but remark-
able nonetheless for its unwillingness to admit to any alterna-
tive holding. 
 Finally, Mr. Lucia, as the petitioner, boldly proclaimed his 
case was the ideal vehicle to resolve the extant Appointments 
Clause controversy.256 Among other things, he asserted the SEC 
had “dramatically increased” by both “number and proportion” the 
enforcement proceedings it placed before its in-house adjudica-
tors, while simultaneously diminishing its resort to the district 
courts,257 that, notwithstanding over a dozen similar cases, only 
                                                                                                             
250 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) 
(No. 17-130) [hereinafter Lucia Petition for Certiorari]. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 2. 
253 See id. at 8–9. 
254 See id. at 19. 
255 Id. at 19 (emphasis in the original). 
256 Id. at 32. 
257 Id. at 33. 
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Lucia and Bandimere collided head-on over the constitutional ques-
tion at the appellate level.258 And lastly, striking a note of im-
pending disaster, Mr. Lucia pleaded that this disarray amongst 
the trial adjudicators, be they judicial or administrative actors, 
could only increase until the high Court restored harmony.259 
 And how did the respondent SEC react to all this? With 
pardons for stating the obvious, the litigant which prevailed in 
the court below typically resists certiorari, and vigorously opposes 
any modification of the outcome obtained from the lower tribunal.260 
 Not so in Lucia. The sea change brought about by the imme-
diately prior presidential election caused both the Solicitor Gen-
eral, Noel J. Francisco, and the SEC, his nominal client, to 
abandon the D.C. Circuit’s rulings favorable to the agency in Lucia 
Cos. I and II.261 The government now urged the high Court to re-
verse the rulings below, on the grounds that the Commission’s 
ALJs were, in truth, officers of the United States.262 Therefore, 
petitioner and respondent agreed that the agency’s in-house ad-
judicators had attained office in contravention of the Appoint-
ments Clause.263 
 But there was more to come from the government. Not only 
did the United States ask the Supreme Court to renounce its victory 
before the D.C. Circuit, it appended a further request to this 180 
degree change in direction.264 The government now requested that 
the high Court “address whether the restrictions imposed by stat-
ute on [the] removal [of the Commission’s ALJs] are consistent 
with the constitutionality prescribed separation of powers.”265 
 In short, the respondent not only joined Mr. Lucia’s argu-
ment as to the unconstitutional appointment of the SEC’s in-house 
                                                                                                             
258 Id. at 34. 
259 Id. at 35. 
260 See UNITED STATES COURTS (Aug. 31, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.us 
courts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-out 
reach/activity-resources/supreme-1 [https://perma.cc/E4GV-5X6M]. 
261 See Cristian Farias, Noel Francisco, Trump’s Tenth Justice, THE NEW 
YORK REPORT OF BOOKS: NYR DAILY (Aug. 29, 2019, 9:04 PM), https://www 
.nybooks.com/daily/2018/08/09/noel-francisco-trumps-tenth-justice/ [https://perma 
.cc/R4ZV-MGMV]. 
262 Brief for the Respondent at 9–10, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) 
(No. 17-130) (November 2017) [hereinafter SEC Certiorari Brief]. 
263 Id. at 14, 18. 
264 Id. at 21. 
265 Id. 
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adjudicators, it added a separate challenge to the laws that immun-
ized these jurists from at-will removal by the Chief Executive.266 
 Finally, for reason of the government’s refutation of the 
D.C. Circuit’s holdings below, the Solicitor General urged the Jus-
tices to appoint an amicus curiae to defend the now orphaned 
decision of the lower tribunal.267 
 Once the government reversed its position, it stayed the 
new course. Subsequent to the grant of review, the United States 
continued to concur with the petitioner that the Commission’s 
ALJs are officers of the United States within the meaning of the 
Appointments Clause.268 Implicitly then, the government con-
tinued to espouse the opinion that the agency’s in-house adjudi-
cators attained office in derogation of Article II’s mandates. 
 The additional challenge respecting removal was refined 
in further briefing, as follows: “whether the statutory restraints 
on removing [the ALJs] from office unconstitutionally impair the 
President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws.”269 In other 
words, if the appointment of the SEC’s administrative law judges 
was constitutionally defective, a fortiori any encumbrance upon 
the Chief Executive’s prerogative to remove those adjudicators 
at will was likewise constitutionally flawed.270 
                                                                                                             
266 See also id. at 18. 
267 Id. at 10. The government’s about-face also engendered financial reper-
cussions, which have yet to be resolved. The prestigious law firm of Gibson, Dunn 
& Crutcher, which represented Mr. Lucia pro bono, has asked the United States 
to pay more than $800,000 for legal fees incurred in securing the petitioner’s 
victory. Filing a fee application with the D.C. Circuit, the law firm cites the 
provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act, a statute which entitles a pre-
vailing party to fees and other expenses unless the government’s position is 
substantially justified. Undoubtedly, this petition for the reimbursement of 
Mr. Lucia’s fees “will place new scrutiny [on] the government’s changed position” 
before the Supreme Court. See Coyle, Gibson Dunn Fee Petition Puts New Focus 
on DOJ Switched Position in SCOTUS, 206 N.Y. L.J. at p. 2, cl. 4 (Dec. 18, 2018). 
See generally Anthony Michael Sabino, And Unequal Justice for All—Bankruptcy 
Court Jurisdiction under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 
453, 458–62 (1992) (analyzing the Equal Access to Justice Act, its purpose, history, 
and statutory provisions). 
268 Reply Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 1, Lucia v. SEC, 
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991)) [hereinafter SEC Reply Brief]. 
269 Id. at 2. 
270 One can only admire the government’s commitment to its newfound posi-
tion. Yet, we are left to ponder, given the confluence of events, if the government’s 
urging of this separate question upon the Justices was influenced by PHH I, 
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 Mr. Lucia and the United States were in accord on an ad-
ditional matter of some significance. As the preceding discussion 
informs us, while the discord between the D.C. and Tenth Circuits 
on the Appointments Clause issue was quite obvious, a near-
majority of other tribunals had avoided the constitutional ques-
tion entirely.271 
 Therefore, a question remained: was this limited conflict 
sufficiently ripe to merit high Court review? Notably, on that point 
the government again agreed with Mr. Lucia.272 The Solicitor Gen-
eral concurred that the petitioner’s case was the superior medium 
for resolution of the Appointments Clause challenge; accordingly, 
it asked that Bandimere be held in abeyance.273 
 One last wrinkle was added to the mix prior to the Su-
preme Court consenting to contemplate the internecine conflict. 
While the petition for certiorari was pending, the Commission 
ratified the appointment of all its ALJs, including the agency 
adjudicator who initially heard the enforcement proceeding 
against Mr. Lucia.274 
 It is a fair supposition that the SEC undertook this reme-
dial step for reasons other than influencing the eventual out-
come in Lucia. Far more practical, the Commission most likely 
promulgated this blanket ratification in order to preserve the 
authority of its in-house adjudicators in pending and future cases, 
and steel the results reached by their current deliberations against 
further constitutional challenges. 
                                                                                                             
and the controversy raised in that proceeding over the Chief Executive’s authority 
to remove a key official in a kindred regulatory body. PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I), 
839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018). 
271 Brief for Anthony Michael Sabino as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 11–12, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (argu-
ing for denying review given that the majority of circuits had yet to rule on 
the Appointments Clause question). 
272 SEC Certiorari Brief, supra note 262, at 24.  
273 Id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, SEC v. Bandimere 844 
F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 17-475). One week after the Court decided 
Lucia, it tied off loose ends by formally declining review of Bandimere. SEC v. 
Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 
(2018). Moreover, Justice Gorsuch took no part in that decision, as he once 
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274 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Order (Aug. 26, 2019, 8:00 
PM), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2017/33-10440.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/PDQ5-TCRD]. 
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 Certainly, it would be excessive to classify as unprece-
dented the events immediately preceding the high Court’s grant 
of review in Lucia. Rather, let us categorize them as unusual, 
insofar as the government, the victor in the proceedings below, 
now effectively wished the ruling in its favor to be reversed. 
 Adding to the intrigue was the United States positing an 
additional question for the Justices to review.275 Clearly, the 
respondent recognized the utility of Lucia, not only to scrutinize 
the constitutional validity of the appointment of the SEC’s ALJs, 
but to examine the companionable question of whether the present 
barriers to the Chief Executive’s removal of the agency’s adjudi-
cators would survive an Appointments Clause test.276 Against this 
somewhat unusual backdrop, Lucia was at last ready for dispo-
sition by the high Court. 
VI. ACT FOUR: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES LUCIA 
 The particulars having now been set forth herein above, it 
is time to review the actual decision of the Supreme Court in 
Lucia. To be sure, the Court ably resolved the constitutional 
challenge to the power of SEC ALJs, while adding to its stock of 
Appointments Clause jurisprudence. Yet, as shall be discussed 
later on, the high Court’s holding, while resolving the controversy 
at hand, might well have presaged future Article II challenges to 
the vast federal bureaucracy. 
 The Court’s summary of the facts was brief; in fact, sur-
prisingly so.277 It quickly noted the Commission’s allegations that 
Mr. Lucia misled investors with his “Buckets of Money” strategy, 
administrative proceedings were presided over by an ALJ, and 
the adjudicator ruled against the respondent.278 
 With similar alacrity, that Court took cognizance of the 
petitioner’s claim that the ALJ held office in violation of the Ap-
pointments Clause, the full Commission rejected his assertion, 
and thereafter a panel of the D.C. Circuit sided with the SEC.279 
                                                                                                             
275 SEC Reply Brief, supra note 268, at 20–21. 
276 See id.  
277 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–50 (2018). 
278 Id. at 2049–50. 
279 Id. at 2050. 
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Few words were spared to note the en banc split of the entire 
D.C. tribunal.280 
 Shockingly terse was the notation that the D.C. Circuit’s 
affirmance in Lucia conflicted with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Bandimere.281 No discussion of Bandimere followed.282 Nor did the 
Lucia Court even mention the differing approaches of the many 
other circuits wherein the power of SEC ALJs was challenged.283 
 Instead, the high bench was content to characterize the 
internecine conflict as a split between those two circuit courts 
alone, effectively adopting Mr. Lucia’s posture as to the question 
to be resolved.284 Indeed, the Court did spare a few words to note 
the government’s about-face on the controversy, and, more im-
portantly, to praise the amicus curiae appointed by the high 
Court to defend the judgment below.285 The preliminaries thus 
disposed of in summary fashion, the high bench moved on to the 
substance of the controversy. 
 Justice Kagan minced no words in pronouncing the issue 
to be resolved.286 “The sole question here,” she declared, is 
whether the administrative law judges of the SEC are “‘Officers 
of the United States’ or simply employees of the Federal Gov-
ernment.”287 After positing the essence of the Appointments Clause, 
the learned jurist acknowledged the undisputed fact that the ALJ 
who decided the petitioner’s case was assigned to the task by the 
SEC staff, and not the Commission itself.288 
 This led to a crucial observation by Justice Kagan. If it was 
decided that the ALJs were, in fact, “officers” of the United States, 
Mr. Lucia’s claim of a constitutional violation was indeed valid.289 
                                                                                                             
280 See id. 
281 See id. (citing Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (2016)). 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at 2050. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 2050–51. The amicus curiae appointed to defend the D.C. Circuit’s 
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Then “[t]he only way to defeat his position” was to hold the Com-
mission’s adjudicators were “non-officer employees” or, put an-
other way, “‘lesser functionaries’ in the Government’s workforce.”290 
 In order to resolve this weighty constitutional question, 
the Court first established a framework for decision, that struc-
ture anchored by two fundamental landmarks.291 The first such 
cornerstone reached back nearly one hundred and forty years 
ago, to Reconstruction Era America. In United States v. Ger-
maine,292 the high bench classified doctors hired by the federal 
government to administer physical examinations as “mere em-
ployees” because the work they performed was but occasional or 
temporary, not continuing or permanent.293 Germaine was thus 
emplaced to occupy one end of the spectrum. 
 The other anchorage was occupied by Buckley v. Valeo, 
well-known as one of the Court’s more illustrious exercises in 
constitutional jurisprudence in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.294 Justice Kagan stressed the importance of Buckley to 
the matter at hand, as the former “set out another requirement, 
central to [Lucia].”295 
 Buckley held that members of a federal commission qualified 
as “officers” for reason that they “exercis[ed] significant authority 
pursuant to the laws of the United States.”296 As summarized by 
the Lucia court, the appropriate inquiry here must focus upon 
“the extent of power an individual wields in carrying out his 
assigned functions.”297 
                                                                                                             
290 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)). 
291 Id. 
292 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879). 
293 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (citing Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12) (quota-
tions omitted). 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
297 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051. As the Court relegated it to a footnote, likewise 
we shall treat the following in a mere parenthetical. Not at issue in the instant 
case was the distinction between “principal” and “inferior” officers. Id. at n.3 (citing 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1997)). Pursuant to the Appoint-
ments Clause, the former can only be appointed by the President, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate; the latter may be appointed by the President, the courts 
or the heads of departments, if Congress so provides for the alternate procedure. 
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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 The Court was clearly motivated to establish these foun-
dation stones because the government, among others, sought an 
elaboration upon Buckley’s articulation of the “significant au-
thority” test.298 Yet the Justices refuted the request, declaring 
“that project unnecessary.”299 
 Rather, the Court looked to another decision along the 
spectrum established by Germaine and Buckley, the case entitled 
Freytag v. Commissioner.300 The Justices found Freytag instructive 
here, for reasons that it applied the “significant authority” test of 
Buckley, without adornment, to adjudicators “who are near-carbon 
copies” to the ALJs in the SEC’s service.301 Indeed, the Lucia Court 
pronounced that the Freytag theorem “necessarily decides” the 
case at bar.302 
 As recapitulated by Justice Kagan, Freytag concerned the 
constitutional status (or lack thereof) of the “special trial judges” 
of the United States Tax Court.303 Referred to by the Court as 
STJs for sake of brevity, the authority of these adjudicators var-
ied from controversy to controversy.304 They could conclusively 
decide relatively minor matters on behalf of the Tax Court.305 
Yet in more significant cases, a STJ was delimited to submitting 
proposed findings and rulings to a Tax Court judge for further 
review, and, presumably, a final judgment.306 
 Specific to Freytag, the disputed tax deficiency was a bil-
lion and a half dollars, a major proceeding indeed.307 Understanda-
bly, the STJ conducted in excess of three months of hearings.308 
When the Tax Court jurist adopted the specialist’s draft decision 
as his own, the aggrieved taxpayer challenged the ruling on the 
                                                                                                             
298 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.  
299 Id. The Court pointedly added that “maybe one day” the need to refine 
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constitutional ground that the STJ did not hold office in con-
formity with the Appointments Clause.309 
 In relating Freytag to the matter at hand, Justice Kagan 
emphasized that the Court in the former case emphasized the 
significance of the duties of office exercised by the STJs.310 Now 
writing for the high bench in Lucia, the Court’s third newest Justice 
stressed Freytag’s reliance upon the fact that these tax special-
ists took testimony, ruled on evidentiary matters, and conducted 
proceedings.311 In doing so, these adjudicators exercised broad 
discretion.312 “That fact meant they were officers, even when their 
decisions were not final,” Lucia declared.313 
 That summary of Freytag given, the Lucia majority reit-
erated that it now possessed everything necessary to decide the 
instant case.314 It found that, similar to the Tax Court’s specialist 
judges, the Commission’s ALJs “hold a continuing office established 
by law,” a fact undisputed by any party, most probably because an 
administrative law judge’s appointment, salary, and duties are 
clearly defined by statute.315 
 Moreover, the SEC’s in-house jurists exercise significant dis-
cretion and perform important functions.316 Justice Kagan pro-
nounced they hold “all the authority needed to ensure fair and 
orderly adversarial hearings,” much like Article III judges.317 
 Once more, Lucia catalogued these essential attributes of 
judicial power as the ability to administer oaths, take testimony, 
examine witnesses, rule on motions, conduct trials, and enforce 
compliance with their directives.318 “So point for point,” in drawing 
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310 Id. 
311 Id. 
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comparisons between STJs and the SEC’s ALJs, Justice Kagan 
found both sets of adjudicators held “equivalent duties and pow-
ers” in the course of completing their assigned tasks.319 
 Lastly, the Commission’s administrative law judges, much 
like their fellows in Freytag, issue decisions—“except with poten-
tially more independent effect.”320 The Lucia majority noted that 
in a major case a Tax Court judge must always review a STJ’s 
proposed findings.321 In contradistinction, if the full Commission 
declines to review the conclusion of one of its own ALJs, then the 
jurist’s decision becomes final and is backed by the full weight of 
the SEC.322 In other words, declared Justice Kagan, “the [Com-
mission] ALJ can play the more autonomous role.”323 
 Characterizing that attribute as a “last-word capacity,” the 
majority deemed it inescapable that the case at bar must fall 
into alignment with Freytag.324 “If the Tax Court STJs are officers, 
as Freytag held, then the Commission’s ALJs must be too.”325 
 To reinforce that holding, Lucia turned to various asser-
tions made in support of viewing the agency’s adjudicators as 
ordinary employees.326 One was that the SEC’s ALJs seemingly 
lack the power to punish contempt; the second, that the Com-
mission’s rules require no deference by the ruling body to an 
administrative law judge’s findings.327 
 The Court would have none of it.328 Even lacking in the 
formal authority to punish contempt of court, a SEC jurist is 
nevertheless empowered to shape proceedings in such a manner 
as to assure compliance with the adjudicator’s edicts, said the 
high bench.329 
 Not the least of these “conventional weapons,” as so poeti-
cally described by Justice Kagan, is the ALJ’s ultimate power to 
issue an opinion, which the full Commission can very well adopt 
                                                                                                             
319 Id. 
320 Id.  
321 Id. at 2053–54. 
322 Id. at 2053. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 2054. 
325 Id.  
326 Id.  
327 Id.  
328 Id.  
329 Id.  
218 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:173 
in toto.330 That capability constitutes sufficient and “substantial 
informal power to ensure the parties stay in line.”331 
 The second argument, pertaining to the standard of over-
sight applied to an administrative law judge’s decision, fared no 
better.332 The standard of subsequent review was of no moment 
to Freytag’s Appointments Clause analysis, found Justice Kagan, 
and so it should not be conclusive in Lucia.333 In any event, held the 
Court, the SEC often accords deference to its adjudicators, par-
ticularly with regard to matters of fact-finding and credibility.334 
 Apparently accepting as true the counter-assertion that the 
Commission employs a generally deferential standard when sitting 
in review of its ALJs, Justice Kagan deemed it nearly automatic 
that the full SEC would rarely upset the holdings of its adjudicatory 
staff.335 In all, the Court found the distinction drawn to “make no 
difference for officer status” in an Article II inquiry.336 And so, the 
majority disposed of the last obstacle to its ultimate declaration. 
 Combining its own reasoning in the case at bar with the 
rationale previously espoused in Freytag, the Lucia Court declared 
that the Commission’s administrative law judges are “officers of 
the United States,” subject to the strictures of the Appointments 
Clause of Article II.337 And since the prerequisites of that consti-
tutional proviso had not been complied with, the SEC’s ALJs held 
office in an unconstitutional manner.338 
 The substance of its holding thus delivered, the high bench 
then turned to the best remedy for the constitutional defect that 
now lay exposed. Justice Kagan commenced with the precept that 
a party who timely challenges the constitutional validity of the ap-
pointment of the adjudicator hearing his case is entitled to re-
lief.339 The Court speedily moved to answer the obvious question 
of what relief accordingly flows from said principle. Justice Kagan 
                                                                                                             
330 Id.  
331 Id.  
332 Id. at 2054–55. 
333 Id. at 2054. 
334 Id. at 2054–55. 
335 Id. at 2055. 
336 Id. at 2054. 
337 Id. at 2055. 
338 Id.  
339 Id. (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995)). 
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readily replied that the most appropriate remedy is a new hearing 
before a constitutionally appointed official.340 But here the Court 
imposed an additional requirement to remediate Mr. Lucia’s con-
stitutional injury.341 
 The Court decreed that the administrative law judge who 
originally heard the petitioner’s case was prohibited from presiding 
at any renewed enforcement proceedings.342 The Court ordered that 
a new ALJ properly appointed pursuant to the Appointments 
Clause oversee all subsequent hearings.343 Justice Kagan postu-
lated that the first adjudicator “cannot be expected to consider 
the matter as though he had not adjudicated it before.”344 To be 
sure, the majority found that, even if the first jurist was subse-
quently appointed in a manner compliant with Article II, that 
remediation would nonetheless be insufficient to expunge the taint 
of the prior constitutional infirmity.345 
 The sanctity of the Appointments Clause having been up-
held, and the appropriate remedy accorded to the petitioner, the 
Supreme Court brought Lucia to a close. Standing above all else 
was the Court’s unequivocal declarations that the administra-
tive law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission were 
officers of the United States, and they could constitutionally 
hold office if they were appointed in a manner compliant with 
the Appointments Clause of Article II.346 Since the ALJ presid-
ing over Mr. Lucia’s proceeding had not, the decision adverse to 
the petitioner was reversed and the enforcement proceeding against 
him was remanded.347 
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 Before departing Lucia entirely, note must be taken of the 
concurring opinion therein of Justice Thomas.348 Justice Thomas’s 
approach to the case at bar was most intriguing. He readily 
agreed that Lucia was “indistinguishable” from Freytag.349 Yet 
that was not enough, he declared.350 Looking to the next test of 
Article II and beyond, Justice Thomas postulated that “this Court 
will not be able to decide every Appointments Clause case by 
comparing it to Freytag.”351 The learned Justice’s concern was 
rooted in his perception that “our precedents in this area do not 
provide much guidance.”352 
 Justice Thomas characterized Freytag as instructing what 
suffices to qualify someone as an officer of the United States, but 
Freytag and its fellows “have never clearly defined what is nec-
essary” to declare that an office-holder has attained the vaunted 
constitutional status of an “officer[ ] of the United States.”353 
 To end this deficiency, Justice Thomas proposed an exam-
ination of the Appointments Clause grounded upon original mean-
ing.354 To that end, the concurring opinion commenced with the 
obligation of an ongoing statutory duty as the foremost defining 
attribute of an officer of the United States.355 
 Turning to the constitutional text, Justice Thomas affirms 
that the Appointments Clause provides the “exclusive process” 
for appointing officers of the United States.356 A subroutine of the 
mandatory procedure is the alternative methodology for appointing 
                                                                                                             
point that the question was not yet ripe for the high Court’s review (and it might 
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“inferior” officers of the United States.357 Here, noted Justice 
Thomas, Article II “strikes a balance between efficiency and 
accountability.”358 
 In contradistinction to principal officers, who must endure 
the arduous process of presidential nomination and Senate rati-
fication, a strictly limited number of governmental actors are 
empowered to appoint junior officers without the rigors of sena-
torial hearings and oversight.359 While accommodating of “the 
sheer number of inferior officers” in service to the Nation, this 
alternative process nonetheless “maintains clear lines of accounta-
bility” to the People.360 Those are the procedures, and the more 
practical reasons behind them, according to Justice Thomas.361 
 Turning to the original meaning of the pivotal terminology, 
Justice Thomas hypothesized that the Founders most likely per-
ceived officers of the United States to be those “who perform an 
ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how important or significant 
the duty.”362 Furthermore, Founding Era documentation reflects 
a generally held belief that the obligations of these federal offic-
ers were duties established and defined by statute.363 
 His journey to the original meaning of the terms in ques-
tion now complete, Justice Thomas applied them to the case at 
bar. He opined that the SEC’s administrative law judges “easily 
qualify” as officers of the United States.364 Setting aside the rel-
ative importance or significance of their duties, Judge Thomas 
declared “[a]ll that matters is that the [ALJs] are continuously 
responsible for performing them.”365 That was conclusive, in the 
estimation of the veteran Justice. 
 For these reasons, Justice Thomas joined the majority in 
its opinion, firmly convinced “the original meaning of the Ap-
pointments Clause” inevitably points to the determination that 
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the Commission’s adjudicators are officers of the United States, 
precisely because they are charged with fulfilling ongoing statu-
tory duties.366 And, since the agency’s ALJs lacked a proper Ap-
pointments Clause pedigree, their holding of office amounted to 
an irremediable constitutional violation.367 
 Our analysis of Lucia does not end here. Equally worthy 
of contemplation is the opinion of Justice Breyer, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.368 We posit this for 
reason of Justice Breyer’s differing methodology, and his focus 
upon certain aspects of this Appointments Clause controversy 
which the majority did not address directly. 
 Foremost in Justice Breyer’s approach was his stated in-
clination to resolve the instant case upon statutory, and not con-
stitutional, grounds.369 This preference was rooted in his grave 
concern that the case at bar necessarily involved the resolution 
of “a different, embedded constitutional question,” that companion 
issue being “the constitutionality of the statutory ‘for cause’ re-
moval protections Congress afforded administrative law judges.”370 
 It is a “well approved principle of constitutional and stat-
utory construction that the power of removal of executive offic-
ers [is] incidental to the power of appointment.”371 No doubt, the 
Justice’s caution arose from the fact of the Solicitor General’s 
change in position on the basic Appointments Clause question 
initially raised by the petitioner, which compelled the United 
States to urge the high Court to resolve this secondary constitu-
tional controversy.372 
 To be sure, Justice Breyer was in concert with the majority’s 
holding that the Commission’s ALJs attain office in contraven-
tion of the Appointments Clause.373 Yet, as aforesaid, his path to 
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2019] LIBERTY REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY 223 
that same conclusion commenced with statutory law, precisely, 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).374 Justice Breyer found 
it critical that the administrative law judge designated in Lucia 
(and his peers elsewhere) was appointed by the SEC staff, not 
the Commission itself.375 
 Justice Breyer contended that the APA, correctly read, be-
stows the appointive power in the Commission, itself a collective 
head of a department, a status in harmony with the explicit text of 
the Appointments Clause.376 By virtue of investing that prerogative 
in the full body, the statute concomitantly forbids its delegation 
to the agency’s staff.377 Such an interpretation of the relevant 
statute, opined the Justice, avoids the more troublesome constitu-
tional question.378 
 Intriguingly, Justice Breyer posited that this analysis “may 
differ for other agencies that employ administrative law judges.”379 
He specifically mentioned the statute governing the Social Security 
Administration and inferred that the abundance of dissimilar 
statutory regimes which govern the plethora of federal agencies 
other than the SEC might well lead to disparate outcomes on 
the same question.380 
 “The upshot, in my view,” emoted Justice Breyer, is that the 
Court should resolve nothing today beyond finding that the Com-
mission’s ALJs were not lawfully appointed.381 But the learned 
Justice urged that this outcome should be reached on statutory 
grounds alone.382 Proceeding to the constitutional question would, 
by necessity, implicate the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise 
Fund.383 To invoke that stalwart precedent in the case at bar 
might provoke “dramatic” results, he warned.384 
                                                                                                             
374 Id. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1999). 
375 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2058 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
376 Id. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. This portion of the concurrence is consistent with Justice Breyer’s 
concern for the continuance in office of the ALJs serving the Social Security 
Administration, as he voiced nearly a decade ago in Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 
561 U.S. 477 (2010). Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2059. 
381 Id. at 2058–59. 
382 Id. at 2057. 
383 Id. at 2059. 
384 Id.  
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 Couching his trepidation in a sequence of hypotheticals, 
Justice Breyer cautioned that making a full-fledged application 
of Free Enterprise Fund to the validity of the appointments in 
question here might then require applying the same rubric of 
constitutional analysis to the concomitant statutory removal 
procedures safeguarding ALJs.385 “This would risk transforming 
administrative law judges from independent adjudicators into 
dependent decision makers,” beholden to the Commission which 
installed them in office.386 Justice Breyer did not sugarcoat his 
reasons for hesitating to act precipitously here. He envisioned any 
continuation of the constitutional inquiry as a threat to the merit-
based civil service system that has held sway for over a century.387 
 Viewed from a certain perspective, it would seem Justice 
Breyer’s key concern was that indulging in an Article II exami-
nation would inevitably lead to the dismantling of the “for 
cause” removal restrictions protecting the continuance of ALJs 
in office.388 Given that danger, he advocated for the Court bind-
ing itself to a statutory analysis only, thereby avoiding the invo-
cation of Free Enterprise Fund, and its unavoidable imposition of 
the strictures mandated by the Appointments Clause.389 
 Justice Breyer then elucidated why he believed that making 
a ruling upon constitutional grounds in the instant case could be 
upsetting to legislative intent.390 Properly understood, the Ap-
pointments Clause grants Congress “a degree of leeway as to 
whether particular Government workers are officers or instead 
mere employees.”391 
 Justice Breyer grounded his belief upon the text of Article 
II, which plainly states that “Congress may by Law” vest the 
appointment of inferior officers in department heads and oth-
ers.392 This suggested to Justice Breyer that “Congress, not the 
Judicial Branch alone, must play a major role” in determining 
                                                                                                             
385 Id. at 2060. 
386 Id.  
387 Id. 
388 Id. at 2061–62.  
389 Id. at 2058–59. 
390 Id. at 2062–63. 
391 Id. at 2062. 
392 Id. at 2060 (emphasis in the original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
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an individual’s classification as an officer of the United States.393 
Accordingly, in these matters legislative intent “is often highly 
relevant.”394 
 Continuing in this vein of circumspection, Justice Breyer 
argued against the imposition of bright-line rules.395 In light of 
the diversity of civil service positions, an examination of their 
statutory underpinnings, “while highly relevant, need not always 
prove determinative.”396 The Justice cited these realities as further 
support for his contention that Congressional intent and formu-
lations have value in classifying persons as officers or employees 
within the vast federal bureaucracy.397 
 Progressing towards his conclusion, Justice Breyer turned 
to the distinct matter of the remedy ordered by the majority in 
the case at bar. And just as separately, he disagreed with the edict 
that a fresh magistrate had to preside over the remand of Mr. 
Lucia’s proceedings.398 Making short shrift of this final issue, 
Justice Breyer deemed it sufficient that the SEC had, as the head 
of department, bestowed a commission of office (albeit subse-
quently) upon the original adjudicator.399 The instant situation 
is no different from the customary remand by a tribunal to the 
initial hearing officer, and Justice Breyer found the matter at 
hand to be indistinguishable from the nominal case.400 
 Justice Breyer concluded the duality of his concurrence 
and dissent with a stern warning. The Court’s methodology this 
day in resolving Lucia was “problematic” at best.401 The bifurcation 
of the appointments controversy from the removal provisions 
                                                                                                             
393 Id. 
394 Id. at 2062–63. Justice Breyer was careful to note that Congress does not 
have a free hand in these matters. The lawmakers may not arbitrarily recatego-
rize true officers of the United States as ordinary employees. No doubt the Jus-
tice was fearful of legislative fiat reshaping the government at the whim of 
Congress. Id. at 2063. 
395 Id. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. 
398 Id. at 2064. 
399 Id. 
400 Id. Among other things, Justice Breyer noted the change in adjudica-
tors was never addressed below, and, more to his point, Justice Breyer could 
not explain “why the Constitution would require” a new ALJ. Id. 
401 Id. 
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question threatened to unravel the entire federal construct of 
administrative adjudication one agency at a time.402 
 Lucia ends there, and now assumes its rightful place in the 
pantheon of constitutional jurisprudence. And while we have de-
scribed in detail the wisdom of the high Court in resolving this im-
portant Article II controversy, we have one vital mission remaining. 
VII. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 
 We come now to the important task of analyzing Lucia. From 
the outset, it must be made clear that we eschew the traditional 
mode of review, that is, merely dissecting this new landmark in 
isolation, with nothing more. That methodology is woefully in-
sufficient in the instant case. 
 To be certain, there is a good deal more to be said with regard 
to this latest proclamation of the Supreme Court. Lucia is a 
landmark first notable for how it arrived at the high Court, for 
reason that its route to the Justices varied from the customary 
path.403 Nor is it even enough to make a more fulsome examina-
tion of this precedent’s lineage. 
 What Lucia bodes for the future, the questions left unan-
swered, and the significant controversies that may yet ensue, is 
equally worthy of our contemplation, possibly more so. We now 
address these points seriatim. 
                                                                                                             
402 Id. Justice Sotomayor, as joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissent, 
wherein she contended that “Commission ALJs are not officers because they 
lack final decision making authority.” Id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
By virtue of this conclusion, she posited “it is not necessary to reach the con-
stitutionality of their removal protections.” Id. at 2067. Lastly, the dissent joined 
Justice Breyer’s contention that the same ALJ who heard Lucia’s enforcement 
proceeding in the first instance could preside on the remand. Interesting on 
two fronts, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent did not find Freytag as essential to 
finding a resolution here as did the majority. Id. Second, the dissent found 
Free Enterprise Fund distinguishable from the case at bar. Id. For reasons we 
shall soon elaborate upon in the subsequent discussion, we cannot help but 
think that the learned dissent garnered the wrong conclusion from certain 
facts, most especially the relative power of the Commission’s ALJs. Justice 
Sotomayor made much of the power of the full body to review, and even reject, 
the holdings of its adjudicators. Yet the dissent gave short shrift to the SEC’s 
inherent power to adopt the findings of its delegates as the agency’s own, let 
alone the possibility, if not the fact, that many proceedings are never carried 
beyond the ALJ level, thereby making the determinations of these adminis-
trative law judges final and binding. 
403 Id. at 2049–51. 
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A. Lucia and Its Appointments Clause Teachings 
 It is only fitting that the first portion of our analysis be de-
voted to the wisdom Lucia imparts with respect to the Appoint-
ments Clause, and our understanding thereof. Again, this is what 
makes this new landmark one of the constitutional variety and 
not merely a resolution of securities law issues. 
 Hereinabove, we have exposited the precise language of 
Lucia; therefore, we have no need at this point to regurgitate 
same. Rather, our analysis shall be of the essentials of this newest 
landmark, for reason that part of Lucia’s elegance is its simplicity. 
 First, consider the initial layer of the Court’s decision. It 
brings together a pair Article II precedents separated in time by 
nearly a century yet bound by their clear expressions of the mean-
ing of the Appointments Clause.404 
 Anchoring one corner of this foundation is Germaine, the 
post–Civil War case that distinguished officers of the United 
States from mere employees, based, in part, upon the perma-
nency of their endeavors.405 
 Standing opposite is the companionable case of Buckley v. 
Valeo, and its wisdom that it is the exertion of significant authority 
by an office-holder which largely determines if that person should 
be classified as an officer of the United States.406 Yet these coun-
terparts, important as they might be, provided only the first 
level of the necessary Appointments Clause critique.407 
 Far more crucial is the role the high Court assigned to 
Freytag in resolving the current controversy regarding the ap-
pointment of the SEC’s ALJs. The first and most telling point is 
the kinship between the adjudicators challenged in Lucia and 
the special trial judges under scrutiny in Freytag. Without put-
ting too fine a point on it, both sets of jurists toiled internally at 
                                                                                                             
404 Id. at 2051. 
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407 As indicated hereinabove, we concur with the Court’s choice not to em-
bellish upon the teachings of Buckley. We agree it would simply have been unwise 
to do so, for any expansion of Buckley would have been superfluous to deciding 
Lucia. Rather, the Justices shall await a justifiable need to clarify Buckley, 
assuming it ever arises, and the proper context in which to expound upon 
that vaunted landmark. 
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important government agencies, deliberated upon complex fac-
tual matters and even more complicated disputes of law, and 
then issued decisions with significant repercussions for private 
citizens embroiled in litigation with the sovereign.408 
 Most compelling, it was the means by which these in-house 
judges adjudicated the matters put before them by their respective 
agencies. Both the SEC’s administrative law judges and the Tax 
Court’s STJs heard testimony, weighted credibility, and held 
considerable sway over the course of these contested proceedings.409 
An exercise of “significant authority,” indeed, as defined by the 
Supreme Court consistently throughout Germaine, Buckley, and 
Freytag.410 In a very real sense, Lucia did not break new ground 
with respect to officer status being derived from the exercise of 
significant authority. Rather, it can fairly be said that Lucia was 
the logical and sensible outcome of its antecedents. 
 Lastly, by placing the probability of the finality of the deci-
sions rendered by the SEC’s in-house judges in contradistinction 
with the potential for conclusiveness enjoyed by the specialist tax 
adjudicators, the Lucia case wisely and pragmatically recognized 
the true extent of the “significant authority” routinely exercised by 
jurists who have much in common in the discharge of their du-
ties.411 Little wonder the Supreme Court declared the SEC ALJs 
of Lucia are almost complete duplicates of the STJs, and therefore 
subject to the exact same Appointments Clause precepts enunci-
ated in Freytag.412 
 It is beyond peradventure that Freytag comprehensively 
listed the elements which classify an office-holder as an officer of 
the United States subject to the requirements of the Appointments 
Clause.413 Lucia shares that same worthwhile characteristic. 
 In this newest Article II landmark, Justice Kagan parsed 
these attributes into two distinct categories: the nature of the 
office and the powers exercised by the appointee.414 
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 As to the first, Lucia bestows officer of the United States 
status where the position in question is established by statute, 
continuously operates (and, conversely, is therefore not intermit-
tent), pays a salary, and imposes duties set out in the law.415 One 
might categorize these as the structural components establish-
ing an appointee as an officer of the United States subject to the 
Appointments Clause. 
 The second body of elements which lead to classification 
as an officer of the United States bound to the rigors of Article II 
are the actual tasks to be performed by the office-holder. 416 The 
greater the discretion exercised by the appointee, the more sig-
nificant the functions she performs, then the more certain the 
individual is an officer of the United States.417 
 Quite telling is how the Lucia majority compared the means 
by which the SEC’s ALJs conduct proceedings with the custom-
ary duties of full-fledged Article III jurists.418 There is an unde-
niable symmetry here. 
 Federal judges attain their lofty posts by an appointive 
process clearly set out in Article II.419 Lucia has now decreed 
that agency adjudicators must undergo the same rigors of the 
Appointments Clause because they exercise a portion of the sov-
ereign power of the United States, again something that only 
true officers of the United States are capable of doing.420 While 
leagues away from parity with the Article III judiciary, this 
shared characteristic compels the imposition of the same consti-
tutional process for appointment.421 
 This was a bold step by the Lucia Court, to so unequivo-
cally catalogue these trappings of judicial authority routinely 
exercised by the Commission’s administrative law judges. To be 
sure, Justice Kagan’s point-by-point comparison was between 
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416 Id. at 2053. 
417 Id. at 2052–54. 
418 Id. at 2053. 
419 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
420 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055. 
421 Recall the earlier observation herein that Congress provided the cata-
lyst for such comparisons when it renamed these adjudicators administrative 
law judges, and explicitly declared that the ALJs shared the characteristics of 
Article III jurists. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
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the Tax Court’s STJs and the SEC’s in-house jurists.422 Yet implicit 
therein was the unmistakable similarity between the nominal 
powers of the latter agency’s adjudicator with the true exercise 
of the judicial power of the United States by those holding the 
office of Article III judge.423 
 In this respect, the eventual outcome of Lucia was obvi-
ous. Once the high Court decided to employ the same methodol-
ogy found in Freytag, the Lucia Court was compelled to reach 
the same outcome. Anything else would have usurped the wisdom 
of the former case. 
 Put another way, if the Freytag Court deemed the special-
ist tax jurists to be officers of the United States because of the 
judicial power they wielded, then regard for precedent—not to 
mention plain sense—required Lucia to make the same declara-
tion for the Commission’s ALJs, who functioned in a nearly 
identical manner.424 
 Also worthy of our respect is Lucia’s close scrutiny of the 
finality of decisions reached by the SEC ALJs, particularly when 
compared to the powers of the STJs in Freytag, and as a compo-
nent of determining status as officers of the United States. The 
Lucia Court took pains to note that the adjunct tax jurists were 
subject to far more oversight of their rulings than the Commis-
sion’s administrative law judges.425 
 Moreover, greater opportunities existed for the ruling of 
an SEC ALJ to avoid further review and become, without altera-
tion, final agency action.426 Justice Kagan’s pithy comment that 
the Commission’s in-house adjudicators enjoy far more autono-
my and independence in rendering their decisions justifies Lucia’s 
holding that these ALJs are truly officers of the United States.427 
Therefore, such persons must attain office in a manner con-
sistent with the Appointments Clause.428 
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 Another astute conclusion reached in Lucia is its refusal 
to equate the absence of a formal power of contempt with a lack 
of authority.429 The high Court deftly notes that a jurist does not 
require the contempt power in order to exercise significant au-
thority.430 
 The SEC’s ALJs were clearly at liberty to shape the pro-
ceeding before them by, inter alia, regulating discovery, testimony, 
and the admission of evidence.431 The Supreme Court fairly noted 
that an adjudicator armed with such a panoply of powers could 
easily control a case, even without a formalistic power to punish 
contempt.432 The mere availability of such options to the Com-
mission’s in-house adjudicators was, by itself, an exercise of the 
significant authority imperative to declaring these ALJs to be 
officers of the United States, and therefore subject to the pre-
requisites of the Appointments Clause.433 
 And the culmination of the judicial powers vested in the 
agency’s ALJs might be the most decisive of all: the ultimate 
power to rule. Lucia recognized that, in a very real sense, the 
power of an administrative law judge to issue a decision is all the 
exercise of significant authority she needs in order to be classi-
fied as an officer of the United States, and one that must withstand 
the rigors of the Appointments Clause vis-à-vis her attainment 
of office.434 
 Lastly, there is the admittedly ancillary, yet no less nec-
essary, component of Lucia’s ultimate adjudication: the degree of 
finality typically bestowed upon the deliberations of the SEC’s 
ALJs. Justice Kagan concisely marshaled the salient points: the 
Commission generally accords deference to the findings of its in-
house adjudicators; it is the exception, not the rule, for the SEC 
to reverse the final determinations of the agency’s jurists.435 In 
those few words, Lucia recognized the truth of the matter; for 
the most part, the rulings of the Commission’s administrative 
law judges wore the imprimatur of conclusive agency actions.436 
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 This small, but nonetheless important, determination un-
derscored the broader holding that SEC ALJs are officers of the 
United States, for reason that they irrefutably exercise signifi-
cant authority, and operate with a fair degree of discretion in 
doing so. Since the high Court had decided years ago in Freytag 
that individuals possessed of that prerogative must attain office 
pursuant to the strictures of the Appointments Clause,437 the 
Lucia Court of the present was simply being consistent with 
established precedent in reaching the same outcome.438 
 Now to summarize Lucia for its own sake. This newest 
Article II landmark decision is built upon the firmest of founda-
tions, specifically Freytag and its kin. In a real sense, Freytag 
supplied the rule of decision here, and rightly so. 
 First, there are the factual similarities which are so striking 
here. True, the Tax Court’s STJs in the Court’s earlier pronounce-
ment were adjuncts to a duly constituted court.439 Nonetheless, 
the Tax Court, and its subsidiary tax adjudicators, are more 
accurately described as administrators of that other bureaucratic 
behemoth, the Internal Revenue Code. Exalting, as we must, 
substance over mere labels, Freytag’s STJs are best classified as 
the administrative law judges of federal tax law. Since it is be-
yond peradventure that the SEC administers a sister monolith 
of national law, to wit, the federal securities acts, the Commis-
sion’s in-house jurists have a great deal in common with the Tax 
Court’s subalterns. Thus, the grounds for Lucia were no differ-
ent from the basis for Freytag, and therefore the outcome of the 
former flowed from the rule established in the latter. 
 Second, let us address the legal principles espoused here. 
The Lucia Court upheld the precepts of law established in Freytag, 
paramount among them that an officer of the United States is 
recognized by her exercise of significant authority.440 In Freytag, 
Special Tax Judges did so by enjoying a fair degree of authority 
in presiding over significant tax controversies, having the power 
to shape proceedings, and were subject to review (and even re-
versed) in certain circumstances.441 Such was the rule of law 
announced in Freytag: the establishment of a multifaceted test for 
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2019] LIBERTY REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY 233 
what is significant authority, the fact that who exercises the same 
is an officer of the United States, and, most of all, that such an 
office-holder must be appointed by a method comporting with 
Article II.442 
 At the end of the day, Lucia made a straightforward ap-
plication of Freytag to the case at bar. The Court of today con-
cluded the Commission’s ALJs exercised as much significant 
authority as their tax law counterparts, possibly even more because 
the deference and general lack of review of the former’s determina-
tions emphasized the significance of the authority they exer-
cised, and the discretion granted them.443 
 Again, precedent ruled the day, as well it should. With the 
cognizable difference between the Tax Court’s STJs and the 
SEC’s ALJs ranging from slim to none, Lucia saw no need to depart 
from the cogent analysis of Freytag.444 Deference to the rule of 
law would not allow such a detour, nor did the situation merit 
such a diversion from the high Court’s established precepts. 
 As a brief aside, we make the following notes for the fu-
ture of Freytag, Lucia, and their progeny. One, we agree with 
Justice Kagan’s common sense in setting aside the government’s 
request to clarify Freytag, in fairness a call, for whatever reason, 
seeking a whole revisitation of that proclamation.445 Lucia rightly 
found such a venture wholly unnecessary to the matter at hand. 
Moreover, the instant case was most likely not the proper vehicle 
for an overhaul of Freytag’s well-known axioms. Nevertheless, 
we candidly admit that day might come, and soon. As a nation, we 
must always be foremost concerned with portentous constitutional 
matters, such as checking the exercise of government power, 
especially by unelected office-holders. For that reason, the reexam-
ination of Freytag postponed by Lucia may yet come before the 
Court, and sooner, as opposed to later. 
 Next, we respect Justice Thomas’ erudite concurrence in 
Lucia, where he makes the discriminating point, inter alia, that 
Freytag (and, by extension now, Lucia) does not resolve every 
Appointments Clause challenge.446 We applaud the veteran Justice 
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for his dual adherence and mild amplification of Freytag to the 
matter then at hand. And we tend to agree with his prediction 
for the future of the appointive proviso of Article II before the 
high bench. We concur; it is most likely that future constitutional 
controversies predicated upon the Appointments Clause will 
require the amplification, clarification, or extension (possibly all 
three) of the maxims now embodied in the conjoined holdings of 
Freytag and Lucia. In this context, we rely upon these sage pro-
nouncements of Justice Thomas: “We have been willing to check 
the improper allocation of executive power” on occasion.447 Even 
more predictive is Justice Thomas’s wry comment that the Su-
preme Court has answered the call “probably not as often as we 
should.”448 We assert that Justice Thomas has the right of it. 
Yes, the Supreme Court has acted to check unbridled executive 
power; Lucia is proof of the high Court’s watchfulness. 
 Yet it is debatable if the high bench needs to do more, in 
the proper context of course. The next Appointments Clause 
controversy might not only prove to be the catalyst for a further 
examination of the axioms found in Freytag, and now Lucia. More 
importantly, it may yield yet another opportunity to apply Article 
II and reinforce, as a check upon executive power, the invaluable 
accountability that safeguards our precious liberty. 
 Lucia is now concluded. By its teachings, we know that 
the SEC’s administrative law judges previously attained office 
unconstitutionally, for reason that the mode of their appoint-
ment did not satisfy the rigors of Article II.449 
 Nevertheless, the Commission’s global order, issued while 
Lucia was sub judice, appears to have written the penultimate 
chapter here. With the agency’s ruling council, as the “head of a 
department,” having bestowed its benediction of approval upon 
the present office-holders, it would seem that the ultimate com-
mand of Lucia has now been complied with. This should con-
clude the matter of the constitutionality of SEC ALJs attaining 
office, at least for the present time. 
 But now, as a newly minted Appointments Clause prece-
dent, Lucia may yet prove to be the pivot upon which the next 
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constitutional challenge shall turn. In truth, Lucia presages, some 
might even say preordains, the next challenge to be brought 
pursuant to Article II. 
B. Avoiding the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance 
 Our second point of analysis is not what Lucia decided. 
Rather, we respectfully ask: was it necessary for the Supreme 
Court to even decide Lucia in the first place? 
 Yes, Lucia is the law of the land, and worthy of its place in 
the pantheon of constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with 
respect to the proper interpretation of the Appointments Clause. 
But it is far too easy to merely deal with Lucia as a fait accompli. 
 Notwithstanding the high Court’s willingness in embracing 
the constitutional question, there are countervailing principles 
of constitutional interpretation that militate against the Su-
preme Court’s willingness to enter the fray. 
 The Lucia Court demonstrated fortitude in resolving the 
constitutional question posed to it. But one must still ask, was 
that strictly necessary? Consider the high Court’s cardinal rules 
with regard to the proper approach to be taken to claims of con-
stitutional infirmities. 
 It is axiomatic that the courts should avoid resolving con-
stitutional questions whenever possible: “If there is one doctrine 
more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional 
adjudication, it is that [the Court] ought not to pass on questions 
of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoida-
ble.”450 This “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” enjoys the 
sanction of “time and experience.”451 It serves an essential need 
to protect both “the law and the adjudicatory process.”452 In sum, 
the courts do not decide constitutional questions “needlessly.”453 
 That “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” was respected 
in full by a significant number of the appellate courts cited herein 
above. Prior to the D.C. Circuit issuing the decision that was to 
come before the high Court, and certainly well before the Justices 
even deigned to grant review of Lucia, the Seventh, Second, 
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Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits had successfully resolved the essen-
tial controversy on grounds other than the Appointments Clause.454 
The relevant tribunals avoided a potential constitutional quag-
mire, not by adroitness, but via adherence to the principle of 
restraint articulated in Zobrest and elsewhere.455 
 In truth, the number of tribunals which fell into this cate-
gory did not aggregate into a strict numerical majority of all the 
circuits.456 Yet they constituted a growing consensus, that, had 
it been given time, might have eventually coalesced into a true 
and undeniable majority of circuit court reasoning. 
 But as to that reasoning, we make an even more telling 
point. Those four august Courts of Appeals made declarations 
eminently rational, and eminently reasonable, in light of the consti-
tutional precept noted above. Each of these panels was faithful 
to the overarching imperative of avoiding a constitutional question 
wherever possible. 
 Interestingly, the tribunals concluding it was better to 
avoid the Article II question comprised less than half of the fed-
eral circuits by number.457 That tally is intriguing, when one 
considers that the relevant Exchange Act bestows upon any per-
son aggrieved by SEC action the prerogative to seek review be-
fore the appellate court of their choice.458 
 Put another way, it could once be said there was ample 
opportunity for the remainder of the circuit benches to add their 
own wisdom to the then nascent conflict, a contentiousness that 
might be fairly deemed at the time as falling short of a genuine 
internecine controversy. Yet the Court’s instant decision in Lucia 
arrested the development of further arguments which might have 
brought the matter at hand to a higher state of evolution. 
 Certainly, it is beyond peradventure that Lucia and 
Bandimere were diametrically opposed. As point in fact, the Tenth 
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456 See generally Bennett, 844 F.3d; Hill, 825 F.3d; Bebo, 799 F.3d; Tilton II, 
824 F.3d. Four out of the thirteen circuits have followed this approach.  
457 See generally Bennett, 844 F.3d; Hill, 825 F.3d; Bebo, 799 F.3d; Tilton II, 
824 F.3d. 
458 15 U.S.C. § 78y (2012). 
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Circuit embraced the irreconcilable conflict.459 But is Supreme 
Court review justified when discord, even pertaining to a subject as 
meaningful as the Appointments Clause, is cabined to only two 
tribunals out of the more than dozen federal appellate courts? 
 Let it be repeated that Lucia is a most worthy and notable 
addition to the Court’s Article II jurisprudence. Yet we are trou-
bled, first by the fact that it might be a proclamation made before 
its time, and even more so, that this new landmark came at a 
cost to even more august principles governing when constitu-
tional arguments should be addressed. 
 Now, take the foregoing axioms favoring the avoidance of 
constitutional questions unless they are unavoidable, and contrast 
them, not only to the situation in Lucia, but how this newest 
Supreme Court landmark may be the harbinger of more Ap-
pointments Clause controversies. 
C. Lucia as the Template for Challenging ALJs 
 An undeniable aspect of modern America is its behemoth 
administrative state. As so well put by Chief Justice Roberts, 
Americans have been forced to tolerate bureaucrats “poking into 
every nook and cranny of daily life.”460 For decades now, regula-
tory agencies and those that toil therein constitute “a veritable 
fourth branch of the Government,” essentially rearranging our 
notions of a tripartite system of governance.461 This extraconsti-
tutional body wields great power, in large part by means of what 
commentators have labeled a “hidden judiciary.”462 
 It is beyond refute that the drafters of the Founding Doc-
uments could not have foreseen contemporary SEC ALJs,463 nor, 
in all likelihood, the latter’s numerous peers presently at work with-
in the far-flung bureaucracy extant today. It is equally unlikely 
                                                                                                             
459 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (expressly disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit’s holding 
in Lucia); see also Lucia Petition for Certiorari, supra note 250, at 19 (“The 
question presented is binary; one of these two decisions must be wrong.”). 
460 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
461 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
462 See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1643, 1645 (2016) (quotations omitted). 
463 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1170. 
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the Framers envisioned these administrative adjudicators would 
outnumber the constitutionally authorized Article III bench by a 
ratio of two to one.464 
 Such matters are well illustrated by Lucia and its ante-
cedents. Therefore, we can only rightfully contemplate this newest 
Supreme Court pronouncement in light of its impact upon the 
opaque administrative branch and its in-house adjudicators. 
 As revealed in the instant controversy, there are reportedly 
a total of 1,792 administrative law judges in service to federal 
agencies today.465 The number of Social Security Administration 
adjudicators provide but one pungent example of the pervasive 
influence of appointed ALJs over the daily lives of many Americans. 
1,537 Social Security Administration ALJs alone “collectively han-
dle hundreds of thousands of hearings a year.”466 
 Such facts were well known to the Court over a decade before 
Lucia appeared on the docket.467 
 This lends credence to the statement that “[t]oo many im-
portant decisions of the Federal Government are made nowadays 
by unelected agency officials.”468 It is common knowledge that 
these agencies and their in-house adjudicators act upon matters 
of grave importance to ordinary citizens.469 
 Equally so, administrative agencies today are rightly said 
to exert significant power over the economic and social life of the 
Nation.470 
 Agencies and their nonjudicial arbiters therefore represent 
one side of a conflict between “executive power and individual 
liberty.”471 If administrative law judges are left unrestrained, 
                                                                                                             
464 See AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS—FROM 1789 TO PRESENT, https://www.us 
courts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships [https://perma.cc/2X5X-HSFC] 
(860 authorized judgeships for 2016). 
465 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 n.5. 
466 Id. at 1199 nn.5–6 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
467 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 542–43 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting in excess of 1,500 ALJs in the employ of the federal gov-
ernment at the time). 
468 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
469 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
470 PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I ), 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
471 Id. at 5. 
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they can pose a “significant threat” to bedrock principles of sep-
aration of powers and checks and balances.472 
 Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of the modern federal 
bureaucracy, Lucia has made it clear that present-day adminis-
trative law judges are susceptible to an Appointments Clause 
challenge. By extending the precepts of Freytag, reflecting the 
theoretical basis of Free Enterprise Fund, and even reaching back 
nearly a century and a half to invoke the teachings of Germaine, the 
Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement has illuminated a path 
towards challenging all in-house adjudicators on the claim that 
they were not appointed consonant with the mandates of Article II. 
 Could Lucia eventually lead to chaos? Certainly, one 
hopes not. Yet Justice Sotomayor alluded to such a possibility in 
her dissent.473 
 To be quite clear, we proclaim that Lucia was inestimably 
correct in its core holding; one upholding the guarantee of liberty 
safeguarded by the Appointments Clause. We applaud Lucia for 
its forthrightness in preserving accountability to the People, 
precisely as the Framers envisioned in the context of Article II 
and executive appointments. 
 Yet we have genuine concerns for the systemic risk it 
might engender. It is virtually assured that Lucia shall unleash 
an untold number of fresh challenges against ALJs across a 
broad spectrum of agencies, and endanger the everyday admin-
istrative adjudications alluded to above. It is not beyond the 
realm of possibility that “all federal ALJs are at risk” in the con-
stitutional wake of Lucia.474 We pause at the thought of the fur-
ther possibility that this new landmark, no matter how necessary 
and correct it might be, “effectively render[s] invalid thousands 
of administrative actions.”475 
 As stipulated at the outset of this Article, it would be folly to 
view Lucia in isolation. This new Supreme Court landmark could 
well be the harbinger of many cases yet to come, each one challeng-
ing the authority of administrative law judges at work at a myriad 
of federal agencies. Indeed, we have little doubt that Lucia shall 
be a wellspring of litigation concerning this constitutional issue. 
                                                                                                             
472 Id. at 6. 
473 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2064 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
474 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
475 Id.  
240 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:173 
 To be sure, this assessment is not wholly our own. A decade 
ago, the high Court itself identified this very possibility. Writing 
in Free Enterprise Fund, Justice Breyer voiced concern over the 
fate of the [then] fifteen hundred plus ALJs then holding of-
fice.476 The in-house adjudicators employed by the SEC are but a 
minuscule fraction of that adjudicative work force.477 Parties 
aggrieved at being called to task before these jurists are com-
pelled, if not mandated, to raise an Appointments Clause chal-
lenge similar to that undergirding Lucia.478 
 Certainly, we have not undertaken an exhaustive study of 
the statutes and procedures governing the appointment of ALJs by 
federal agencies other than the overseer of the securities markets; 
to do so would unnecessarily detract from the focus of this Article. 
 Yet the point is irrefutable. It is more likely than not that 
such adjudicators, for reason of their sheer numbers alone, attain 
office via a methodology far more like an internal, bureaucratic 
process, and quite different and removed from the methodology 
demanded by Article II. 
 Even further beyond peradventure is the undeniable fact 
that the Commission’s ALJs and their peers at sister agencies 
have a commonality of adjudicative power. At the risk of over-
simplification, most, if not all, of these administrative judges 
operate in an identical manner: they preside over contested mat-
ters; hear testimony, review evidence, and decide the probity and 
weight of same; and eventually these ALJs issue rulings which 
carry the force of their parent agency.479 
 With respect to the latter, as a matter of practicality, such 
determinations might be final indeed, as the mere availability of 
an appeal (either higher in the subject agency or by an Article 
III court) by no means guarantees that the option of subsequent 
review will actually be exercised.480 
                                                                                                             
476 Free Enter. Fund v. PCOAB, 561 U.S. 477, 542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
477 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049 (noting that the SEC currently has only 
five ALJs). 
478 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 543–44. 
479 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049. 
480 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(Henderson, K., dissenting). In her erudite dissent, Judge Karen LeCraft 
Henderson cautioned the mere fact that there exists a statutory right of appeal to 
a circuit court (the typical avenue offered to those disadvantaged by an ALJ’s 
decision) does not absolve any constitutional infirmities in the appointive process 
for particular administrative law judges. 
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 The salient point of Lucia is that it identified the key attrib-
utes which determine if an adjudicator holds the rank of officer 
of the United States.481 This latest promulgation of the high Court 
confirmed the parameters previously set forth in Freytag, and 
then refined them, for the purpose of establishing a fairly com-
prehensive test for the application of Article II to questions of 
executive appointments.482 
 Lucia is a powerful edict, for it first catalogues these adjudi-
cative prerogatives, and then finds that SEC administrative law 
judges fall squarely within its ambit.483 From there, it is a 
small—and unavoidable—step to classifying these in-house ad-
judicators as officers of the United States who can attain their 
office solely by means of compliance with the strictures of the 
Appointments Clause. 
 Lucia has the truth of it, then: agency adjudicators exer-
cising significant authority are officers of the United States.484 
 Therefore, they are susceptible to a constitutional chal-
lenge unless they attained office in a manner compliant with the 
Appointments Clause.485 Without such conformity, they fail to 
meet the demands of Article II. In postulating these axioms, the 
Supreme Court’s newest Appointments Clause landmark not 
only establishes the template for future litigation, it invites it. 
D. Lucia’s Unanswered Question and the Next Constitutional 
Crisis for the Appointments Clause 
 Many have predicted that the next constitutional crisis shall 
arise from the question deliberately left unanswered by the high 
Court in Lucia: do statutory restrictions upon the President’s power 
to remove administrative law judges violate the Appointments 
Clause?486 Recall the respondent SEC urged the Justices to re-
solve this query, but the high bench declined.487 
                                                                                                             
481 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54.  
482 Id. at 2053. 
483 Id. at 2053–54. 
484 See id. at 2053–55. 
485 See id. at 2055. 
486 Id. at 2059–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Steven D. Schwinn, Lucia v. 
SEC and the Attack on the Administrative State, AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 256 (2017–18). 
487 See Brief for Respondent at 21, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) 
(No. 17-130). 
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 Certainly, we acknowledged the existence of the question 
of an earlier point in this Article but did so in a deliberately un-
derstated manner. Our rationale was since the Supreme Court 
did not formally embrace the issue, it would be unwise for us to 
elevate it from subtext. 
 After all, it must be recalled that the government was 
most insistent that the Justices openly adopt this additional 
query and resolve it as an essential part of Lucia.488 Yet since 
the high Court effectively ignored the sovereign’s plea, we were 
not at liberty to differ.489 
 Until now. To be quite sure, we concur that Lucia was not 
the appropriate vehicle to decide if Article II is violated when 
the President’s power to remove an administrative law judge is 
constrained by statute. All the government’s protestations to the 
contrary, the Court was indisputably correct to avoid that con-
stitutional question on the day it accorded Mr. Lucia victory. 
But there is another reason, one far more just and powerful. 
 The Lucia Court was right not to decide the removal 
question because, in all likelihood, it shall soon find its own way 
to the high bench. However, the vehicle for that next constitu-
tional adjudication has yet to be determined. At least one prime 
contender did not answer the bell, but other possibilities now 
loom in the lower courts. 
 With respect to the former, a most worthy candidate would 
have been PHH II, a D.C. Circuit decision we alluded to previously 
herein.490 That bifurcated controversy touched upon many of the 
Article II points raised in Lucia, most especially the constitu-
tionality under an Appointments Clause analysis of a statutory 
bar to the President removing an agency official from office.491 
 So as not to detract from this Article’s proper focus upon 
Lucia, we summarize PHH II ever so briefly. At an earlier stage, 
a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit declared that the Director 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the CFPB) held 
office unconstitutionally because he could not be removed by the 
                                                                                                             
488 Id. 
489 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2060–61 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
490 See supra notes 51–68 and accompanying text. 
491 PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2018); id. at 
156–57 (Henderson, J., dissenting); id. at 166 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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President.492 In a forceful opinion rendered by then–Circuit Judge 
Kavanaugh, the tribunal found the statutory provisos insulating 
the CFPB’s Director from removal by the Chief Executive were 
an irremediable violation of the Appointments Clause.493 
 Subsequently, a sharply divided D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, 
reversed the panel, and declared that the sanctity of the Appoint-
ments Clause was unmolested by the ability of the agency’s chief 
to retain office without fear of removal by the Chief Executive.494 
 PHH II, most especially its dissent, deals with many of 
the same issues addressed in Lucia, among them, the Appoint-
ments Clause, the accountability of Executive Branch function-
aries to the President and, therefore, the People, and the liberty 
interest preserved by that same accountability.495 Indeed, as so 
ably argued in the erudite dissents found in PHH II, the Presi-
dent’s inability to remove an administrative agency official is 
doubly sinful. 
 Its first transgression is that it renders the office-holder 
unaccountable to the People.496 Its second affront, equally offensive 
to the Constitution, is that it exonerates the President from account-
ing to the People for the actions of a member of officialdom.497 
 In hindsight, one might speculate that the Lucia Court 
deliberately left the removal question for another day because 
there was some supposition that PHH II would eventually find 
its way to the high Court’s docket. Yet such musings are futile. 
As fate would have it, neither side petitioned for Supreme Court 
review of the D.C. Circuit’s fractious opinion.498 
 As made clear in our references to PHH II, and its prede-
cessor PHH I, at various points within this Article, that proceed-
ing was driven by the maxim of liberty requires accountability, 
but with its Appointments Clause connotations viewed via the 
                                                                                                             
492 PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I ), 839 F.3d 1, 31, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and remanded en banc, PHH II, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
493 Indeed, then–Circuit Judge Kavanaugh described this offense against 
Article II in the most egregious of terms. Id. at 7–9. 
494 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 137. 
495 Id. at 164, 183 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
496 Id. at 164–66. 
497 Id. at 164, 166, 168. 
498 See, e.g., Barbara S. Mishkin, No U.S. Supreme Court review sought in 
PHH, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (May 4, 2018), 
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prism of the correlative power to remove, as opposed to appoint. 
Nonetheless, given the congruency of the two under any Article 
II scrutiny, it is a given that Lucia would have powerfully influ-
enced, if not outright provided the rule of decision, had PHH II 
been granted high Court review.499 
 Yet there is no need for disappointment; rather, anticipa-
tion, albeit measured, is in order. For while PHH II never proved 
to be the vehicle for the Supreme Court to resolve Lucia’s unan-
swered question, other controversies are looming on the horizon, 
and may yet arrive before the Justices in due course. 
 Indeed, it would seem the same administrative agency at 
the eye of the storm in PHH II abounds with such possibilities 
for further testing of the demands of the Appointments Clause. 
One such instance involving the embattled Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau is C.F.P.B. v. RD Legal Funding, LLC.500 There, 
Senior District Judge Loretta J. Preska, former Chief Judge of 
New York’s illustrious Southern District, dismissed an agency 
enforcement action “because [the CFPB’s] composition violates 
the Constitution’s separation of powers.”501 The learned district 
judge openly rejected the majority holding of PHH II, choosing to 
explicitly adopt then–Circuit Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in that 
fractious D.C. Circuit holding.502 
 Embedded in Judge Preska’s pithy constitutional analysis 
was the Article II violation inherent in the CFPB’s infrastructure, 
to wit, the inability to remove the agency’s head at the will of 
the Chief Executive.503 While the gravamen of the RD Funding 
                                                                                                             
499 See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, No. 18-5062, 2018 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 16266, at *1, *4 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019). 
According to the petitioner, the unpublished decision of the D.C. tribunal was 
“wholly based” upon PHH II. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Mnuchin, 139 S. 
Ct. 916 (2019) (No. 18-307); see also Marcia Coyle, Justices, With Kavanaugh Side-
lined, Rebuff Challenge to Consumer Bureau, ALM MEDIA (Jan. 16, 2019) (LEXIS) 
(detailing, inter alia, the substance of the constitutional challenge to the authority 
of the CFPB’s solitary director, and Justice Kavanaugh’s recusal from the contro-
versy, for reason of the depth of his participation in PHH I and II ). As point 
in fact, we concur with the reported view of the Solicitor General that the Supreme 
Court should await a vehicle wherein the entire high bench may participate 
without restraint. Id. 
500 CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 745–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
501 Id. at 785 (quotations and citations omitted). 
502 Id. at 784. 
503 Id. at 784–85. 
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decision rests upon separation of powers, the interrelationship of 
those maxims to the operation of and justification behind the 
Appointments Clause cannot be minimized. Judge Preska’s clear 
adoption of the notions espoused in PHH II’s dissent verifies the 
kinship and shared rationales of both opinions.504 
 Presuming RD Funding remains controversial, the Supreme 
Court may eventually find this case to be the proper vehicle to 
respond to the removal question so ardently posited by the SEC 
in Lucia, and thereby extend Appointments Clause analysis set 
forth in that new landmark.505 
 In sum, and no matter if the chosen vehicle for resolution 
is RD Funding or another controversy, we respectfully submit Lucia 
shall be the touchstone for the high Court’s eventual decision 
regarding the Appointments Clause and the removal power. Moreo-
ver, Lucia’s safeguarding of liberty by imposing accountability 
will, we steadfastly believe, dictate the very pattern and outcome 
of the Supreme Court’s next addition to the Article II pantheon. 
 What we are most assured of is the following. Lucia, in its 
brevity, in its forthrightness, in its certitude, made it absolutely 
clear that inhabitants of administrative agencies who hold a 
certain degree of power are officers of the United States.506 
Thus, they must attain office in manner strictly compliant with 
the Appointments Clause.507 Only in this way can the precept 
“[l]iberty requires accountability” be met.508 
 Given that the new landmark known as Lucia has memori-
alized the foregoing as a constitutional truth, can the congruent 
removal question be decided any differently? Respectfully, we 
think not. 
                                                                                                             
504 Id.  
505 Ever so briefly, we note that the existence of a case pending before the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 
No. 3:16-CV-356 (WHB) (JCG), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131595, at *2 (S.D. 
Miss. Mar. 21, 2018), argued No. 18-60302 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2019), where the 
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dates for bringing Lucia’s unanswered question regarding the Appointments 
Clause and the President’s power to remove administrative agency officials 
before the Justices again, and this time in full flower. 
506 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018). 
507 Id. at 2055. 
508 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, 
J., concurring).  
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 Rather, we are of the firm opinion that impediments to the 
President’s power to remove a bureaucrat exercising significant 
decision-making power are just as violative of the Appointments 
Clause as deficiencies in the Chief Executive’s authority to ap-
point such office-holders in the first instance. And given the 
parallels therein, our expectation is that Lucia will unequivocally 
shape the next permutation of the Supreme Court’s Appoint-
ments Clause jurisprudence. 
E. Liberty, Accountability, and Lucia 
 From the outset of this Article, we have maintained that 
Lucia is not a mundane instance of challenging administrative 
agency power via questioning the authority of administrative 
law judges. Rather, it encompasses a true test of the very bed-
rock principles of our ordered system of liberty, specifically the 
preservation of that liberty by maintaining the accountability of 
government to the People. 
 Let us commence this section of our commentary with the 
fundamentals. From the founding to the present day, the American 
people can boast of a government which functions by the consent 
of the governed.509 This is so because the national government so 
constructed derives all of its sovereign power from the People.510 
 The Appointments Clause of Article II contributes mightily 
to preserving the consent of the governed. The proviso is elegant in 
the simplicity of its operation, as follows: the President is accounta-
ble to the People, and officers of the United States are accounta-
ble to the Chief Executive.511 A citizen aggrieved by the actions 
of a member of officialdom brings her complaint to the President, 
who then requires the appointee to justify his actions.512 
 Not only does this assure the continued sovereignty of the 
People, it also comports neatly with the President’s sworn duty 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”513 To fulfill 
her own oath of office, the Chief Executive shall be compelled to 
                                                                                                             
509 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S 624, 641 (1943). 
510 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
511 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010). 
512 Id. at 497–98. 
513 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (“The 
President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot 
oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”). 
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commission competent and trustworthy individuals as the sworn 
officers of the United States.514 
 Thereafter, and for as long as she holds office, the President 
is free to call upon her appointees for an accounting.515 Conversely, 
all true officers of the United States are keenly aware that they 
are answerable to the Chief Executive, and, thereby, the People, 
the ultimate holders of the sovereign power.516 In sum, this ac-
countability guarantees liberty. 
 Lucia is further premised upon the fact that “[t]hose who 
exercise the power of Government are set apart from ordinary 
citizens.”517 Precisely to forestall this tiny fraction of the population 
from standing apart and aloof from the general citizenry, the Su-
preme Court has declared it essential that “[t]here should never 
be a question whether someone is an officer of the United States.”518 
 By its robust and fair application of the Appointments 
Clause to the matter set before it, the Lucia Court assured that 
those who hold office, and are entrusted with sovereign authority 
by the President, are easily classified.519 Once properly categorized, 
the Appointments Clause assures their accountability to the Chief 
                                                                                                             
514 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 6 (the President commissions all officers 
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tionality of the Federal Housing Finance Agency). 
517 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1235 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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the exercise of sovereign power). 
519 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–55 (2018). 
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Executive who appointed them, and, thereby, to the People who 
elected that same chief magistrate. 
 Lucia is a sterling example of these vaunted precepts in 
action. The petitioner therein was aggrieved by the actions of 
the SEC and its in-house adjudicator, each an ostensible part of 
the Executive Branch.520 Under normal circumstances, as envi-
sioned by the Appointments Clause, a citizen such as Mr. Lucia 
would have brought his complaint to the President, who is ac-
countable to the People, and the Chief Executive would have 
called to account the agency and its jurist. 
 Yet that was a pointless exercise here, because the ALJ had 
never been appointed by the President.521 Lacking appointment 
by the Chief Executive meant a corresponding lack of accounta-
bility, an affront to the very raison d’etre of the Appointments 
Clause. Thus, could the Supreme Court’s finding that the Clause 
had been violated come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the 
essence of the Article II proviso? 
 Moreover, if Lucia had been decided differently, it would 
have fostered, not only a lack of accountability by the SEC’s 
ALJs, but an evasion of accountability by the President. Not-
withstanding that the President is accountable to the People, 
how can she answer for the actions of those who have no cause 
to account to her?522 Of the two unsavory possibilities set forth 
above, we deem the latter to be far more dangerous to our ordered 
system of liberty. 
 It must be said that the erosion of the accountability of 
the President to the People is no less dangerous then the accre-
tion of power to the Chief Executive. Nor does it matter if that 
reapportionment comes swiftly or at glacial pace.523 Strange but 
nevertheless true, diminishing the need for the President to 
account increases the power of the Chief Executive. Either out-
come is antithetical to the People’s liberty interest. 
                                                                                                             
520 Id. at 2049–50. 
521 Id. at 2050. 
522 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010) (“Without a 
clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot determine on whom the 
blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures 
ought really to fall.”) (citation and quotations omitted). 
523 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). 
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 Another truism is that any dispersion of responsibility 
within government only engenders more of the same.524 That is 
why the accountability mandated by the Appointments Clause is 
so vital to our ordered system of liberty. Implicit in Lucia is a 
stern warning regarding the danger to freedom offered by non-
chalance towards accountability, and the even greater danger of 
severing the chain of accountability in its entirety.525 
 By means of its unswerving enforcement of the process for 
appointment mandated by the Appointments Clause, Lucia keeps 
faith with the long line of high Court precedent which has staunchly 
defended the prerogative of the elected President to oversee the 
unelected bureaucracy and prevent the latter from retreating 
into a limbo of unaccountability.526 
 Lucia is invigorated from the Supreme Court’s prior dec-
larations that we cannot permit the contemporary Administra-
tive State to “slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from 
that of the people.”527 This latest Supreme Court landmark fully 
acknowledges that the consent of the governed degenerates into 
mere theory unless those appointed to execute the laws are 
compelled to account to the Chief Executive in a meaningful 
way.528 Lucia marks the next evolution in that line of constitu-
tional maxims, and it simultaneously draws strength from and 
strengthens its antecedents interpreting and enforcing the man-
dates of the Appointments Clause. 
 For our coda, we repeat that Lucia did not merely adjudi-
cate a dispute centered upon federal securities law. This new 
landmark is so much more. It is truly a reaffirmation of the core 
precept that liberty requires accountability, and that the Ap-
pointments Clause is one of the most important tools in assuring 
the reality of that accountability to the People. 
 It is an unfortunate fact that since the 1930s, much of the 
sovereign power has been delegated to a plethora of administrative 
                                                                                                             
524 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497. 
525 Id. at 495–96 (decrying the situation where an executive organ is not 
accountable to the President, and where the Chief Executive can deny responsibil-
ity for the actions of the bureaucrats ensconced within that agency). 
526 Id. at 498–99. 
527 Id. at 499. 
528 See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 137 (Henderson, J., dissenting). 
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agencies (including their administrative law judges), “making 
accountability more elusive and more important than ever.”529 
 That is why Lucia represents such an important contribution 
to the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence. 
Since the founding of the nation, the Constitution, in all its aspects, 
has been the solemn mechanism by which the People govern 
themselves, through their duly elected leaders.530 
 And even as difficult as it might be in the vast ocean of 
the Administrative State, the People remain firmly on the course 
of self-government by keeping the bureaucracy accountable, via 
bulwarks of liberty such as the Appointments Clause. Liberty 
does require accountability, and Lucia shall henceforth play a 
role in that vital exercise, by first clearly defining who stands as 
officers of the United States and utilizing the strictures of the 
Appointments Clause to assure their accountability, thereby 
preserving liberty. 
CONCLUSION 
 When all is said and done, we are confident that Lucia is 
the beginning, not the end, of a fresh epoch of constitutional 
challenges to executive power. Lucia is the next forthright pos-
tulation of the plain meaning of Article II, and the procedures it 
mandates, all purposed to assure accountability to the People. 
 Moreover, while Lucia is forceful in its own right, it gar-
ners further strength from its classification of Freytag’s leading 
principles, and, to a slightly lesser extent, reinforces landmarks 
of an older vintage, such as Germaine. To be sure, even while 
Lucia does not overtly reference Free Enterprise Fund, implicitly 
the former incorporates the latter’s fundamental holdings as to 
Article II’s basic protection of our ordered system of liberty. 
 In the preceding pages, we have candidly predicted that 
Lucia shall be the progenitor of a new generation of Appoint-
ments Clause challenges to agency power. Utilizing the new 
landmark as a template and guided by its axioms as to the process 
for the constitutional appointment of officers of the United States, 
parties subject to in-house adjudications can assure that the 
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presiding jurist holds her office in conformity with the constitu-
tional mandates decreed by Article II. 
 Far more important, citizens can be confident there exists 
an accountability of government which, in turn, safeguards their 
liberty. 
 Are more Appointments Clause cases for the good? Une-
quivocally yes. The proviso, along with the rest of Article II, cabins 
executive power, simultaneous with establishing the prerogatives of 
the Executive Branch. It assures a process by which the nonde-
script functionaries of the Fourth Branch of government must 
answer to the People, through the person of the Chief Executive. 
 We conclude this Article with the concise, yet eloquent, 
words of Justice Alito. “Liberty requires accountability.”531 Lucia 
now stands at the apex of the Appointments Clause jurisprudence 
which guarantees that vital precept shall continue to safeguard 
our precious liberties. 
                                                                                                             
531 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
